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Small submersible vessels have been used for years by nation states, terrorist groups, and 
criminal organizations to achieve operational objectives. These entities have sought to 
capitalize on the overriding tactical advantage of submersible technology which is stealth. 
For example, drug trafficking organizations in Central and South America have been 
routinely using self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to clandestinely transport large 
quantities of illicit drugs to North America. Small submersible vessels can also be 
nefariously used in the maritime domain to transport persons or weapons or they could be 
used as waterborne improvised explosive devices. Terrorists and criminals are complex 
adaptive adversaries and are driven to innovate when confronted with threats to their 
operational effectiveness. Innovation and adaption are driving these foes to leverage 
disruptive technology towards the development or acquisition of fully-submersible 
vessels. Furthermore, there is a growing population of privately owned submersibles 
within the U.S. that policymakers have little visibility of.  Homeland security 
policymakers lack adequate situational awareness regarding the vulnerabilities, threats, 
and consequences to the maritime transportation system from the malicious use of 
submersibles. The core challenge for the maritime homeland security enterprise with 
regards to submersibles is developing effective strategies to mitigate their potential risk. 
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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Small submersible vessels have been used throughout history by insurgencies, 
terrorist organizations, criminal cartels, and nation states to further their individual 
agendas and objectives.  The term submersible, as used in this thesis, indicates that a 
vessel weighs less than 300 gross tons and has the capability of semi- and/or fully-
submersible operation. Throughout this thesis, this word may be used interchangeably 
with such terms such as submarine, mini-submarine, mini-sub, midget submarine, self-
propelled semi-submersible, and self-propelled fully-submersible. The threat posed by 
submersible technology is emerging as small submersibles become increasingly available 
to those who would use this technology in disruptive ways against society. 
The use of semi-submersible vessels by international drug cartels as part of their 
complex transnational multimodal distribution networks is one example of how 
submersible technology is being used in a manner that threatens the national security of 
multiple nation states in North, Central, and South America.  Between 2000 and 2007 
there were 23 documented self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) voyages conducted by 
drug trafficking organizations (Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible [SPSS] Watercraft, 
2011). In the first six months of fiscal year 2008, there were 45 recorded SPSS voyages 
and it is estimated that SPSSs account for 32 percent of all maritime cocaine flow (SPSS 
Watercraft, 2011).  Additionally, terrorist organizations have sought to leverage 
submersible technology for their own strategic purposes. Lastly, there are an unknown 
number of private submersibles operating within the U.S., but there is no comprehensive 
data that would allow homeland security policymakers to conduct any meaningful 
analysis or risk estimation. 
B. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
Submersible vessels have been used by terrorist groups, such as the Tamil Tigers 
in Sir Lanka, to conduct regional operations and by drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) to clandestinely transport large shipments of illegal drugs bound for the United 
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States (Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2008). The current submersible threat can 
be domestic or could originate from outside the continental United States. Submersibles 
have the capability to be used to covertly smuggle drugs, weapons, or persons into the 
United States. The vessels themselves can be used as stealth waterborne improvised 
explosive devices (WBIEDs). The ability of these vessels to evade detection and 
interdiction efforts, combined with their ability to transport large payloads undetected 
over great distances, constitutes an emerging meta-threat to the homeland security 
enterprise (HSE).  
Submersible vessels pose a meta-threat to maritime homeland security (MHS) 
because of their multi-dimensional attributes and capabilities. In the context of this paper, 
a meta-threat is a means for conducting maritime asymmetrical hostile operations against 
the HSE by capitalizing on the tactical advantages of submersible vessel technology 
while simultaneously exploiting the strategic weaknesses of the HSE. Submersible 
vessels have the capability of successfully evading detection while maintaining the ability 
to be an effective conveyance for weapons, personnel, and drugs, or they can be utilized 
as a stealthy self-guided underwater weapon of mass effect (WME). Although the 
technical attributes and capabilities of small submersible vessels are well known, their 
potential threat to the maritime transportation system (MTS) is not fully understood by 
homeland security policymakers. This misunderstanding of the threat tends to obscure 
efforts to accurately define and mitigate strategic risk in regards to the misuse of 
submersibles by criminals or terrorists resulting in the threat not being specifically 
addressed in current homeland security (HS) strategy or policy.  Another attribute that 
contributes to small submersibles being defined as a meta-threat is that so little data exists 
regarding their locations, ownership, and operational characteristics within the territorial 
waters of the United States (U.S.) that it is impossible to accurately estimate any risk they 
may pose. 
Current maritime homeland security strategy does not specifically address small 
submersible threats and this is an emerging area of potential concern for HS 
policymakers to consider. Although national maritime strategies, such as the Small Vessel 
Security Strategy (SVSS), do not primarily focus on the threat posed by submersible 
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vessels, there have been some efforts to address submersible use by drug smugglers 
through federal legislation. The Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) of 
2008, which allows for the prosecution of the crews of SPSS vessels that are involved 
with international drug trafficking, but does not address the use of these vessels to 
facilitate acts of terror or the misuse of a submersible vessel within U.S. waters. The 
current focus of maritime law enforcement and regulatory agencies appears to be on 
preventing these vessels from delivering illegal drugs to cross-border distribution 
networks, which are intent on delivering them to the U.S., and not in deterring the use of 
these vessels by international terrorist organizations (ITOs) or homegrown violent 
extremists (HVEs).  
Domestically, there are privately owned mini-submarines and semi-submersible 
vessels that could be just as useful to terrorists as the ones owned operated by drug 
cartels; however, the exact number of them is unknown as there are no federal or state 
requirements or capabilities to track these vessels. Most privately owned mini-subs and 
semi-submersibles are not regulated by federal or state law except for the general safety 
and registration requirements that would be required for any other recreational surface 
vessel. This means that no single agency within the HSE can provide a common 
operational picture (COP) with regards to privately owned submersibles. Since most 
privately owned small vessels, including submersibles, are not federally regulated, there 
is no requirement for them to have a security plan and the owners/operators are not vetted 
against any terrorist watch list nor do they even have to pass a criminal background 
check. Additionally, there is no requirement for small unregulated vessels to transmit data 
via automatic identification system (AIS) technology, which would provide real-time 
vessel position data to maritime stakeholders such as the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).    
Although the threat posed by these submersible vessels is generally recognized by 
HS policymakers (Wilkenson, 2008), there is no specific reference to them in current HS 





strategic collaboration and sound HS policy can scarce resources be effectively used to 
counter this emerging threat by using tools such as risk-based decision-making 
(RBDM).1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary research question of this thesis is: How should the homeland security 
enterprise react to the emerging technology and availability of submersible vessels? 
The primary research method for this thesis was a multi-level policy analysis that 
focused on evaluating existing HS policies in terms of their ability to identify and 
mitigate the security threat posed by submersible vessels. The primary objective of this 
policy analysis was to determine if current policy can effectively achieve the stated 
policy goals and, if not, to recommend appropriate policy changes and/or modifications. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
This research will contribute to the limited body of knowledge surrounding the 
HS threat posed by submersibles and the impact on current policy. Although this threat 
has been around for some time, it began to garner increased attention in the late 1990s. 
Even so, to date, there has been limited serious academic focus on this issue. This 
research will add to a foundation for future research efforts focused on the submersible 
threat.  
The primary consumers of the research are the multiple stakeholders comprising 
the MHS enterprise. These local agencies include city and county marine patrol units, fire 
departments, and port authority police departments. State agencies include state police 
agencies, regional dive teams, and any other state agency that has a stake in maritime 
security or marine safety. Primary federal consumers include the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and subordinate agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  Other federal agencies, such as the U.S. 
                                                 
1 Risk-based decision making is a process that attempts to quantify and compare the relative risks of 
similar events and assigns rank order precedence to them. This method of risk analysis is used by decision 
makers to either eliminate or reduce risk by identifying the least risky courses of action (Risk Management, 
2010). 
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Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) Northern 
and Southern Commands, may find utility in this research. In addition, international 
organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), may also find 
utility in this research for policy formulation. Providers of marine insurance services to 
the MTS, such as Lloyd’s of London, could also utilize this research in their risk 
estimation and mitigation activities. Additionally, U.S. Coast Guard sponsored area 
maritime security committees (AMSCs) may benefit from this research in respect to 
developing and updating their area maritime security plans (AMSPs). HS practitioners 
and leaders will also benefit from this research by gaining a fundamental understanding 
of this emerging meta-threat and its policy implications.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review identifies relevant sources concerning the developing threat 
of submersibles vessels to MHS. It was not until the late 1990s that intelligence analysts 
saw an increase in the use of these types of vessels by DTOs in Central and South 
America. The majority of the available literature is in the form of media reports of high 
profile seizures of illegal drugs carried as cargo on these vessels. Additional media 
reports cover the confiscation of partially built self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) or 
self-propelled fully-submersibles (SPFS) in improvised covert jungle shipyards in Central 
and South America. There have also been some published threat analysis products that 
address the capability and use of submersible vessels by drug traffickers and terrorist 
organizations. This topic has been the subject of very few published books since much of 
the information is classified in order to protect sources and methods with regard to 
intelligence collection activities. The last major category of literature on this subject is 
policy related. There are several national strategies that have been developed since 
September 2001 that are primarily focused on maritime security, but none specifically 
address this meta-threat. Overall, the depth and breadth of academically accepted 
literature on this subject is scarce, which creates an intellectual gap for HS policymakers. 
The following highlight the current state of literature regarding the submersible vessel 
threat to MHS. 
 6 
The bulk of the literature constitutes media reports and journal articles. The 
discovery of a partially completed fully-submersible submarine was recently featured in 
Wired magazine (Popkin, 2011). The vessel of interest was discovered in a clandestine 
shipyard in the jungles of Ecuador (Popkin, 2011). Although no drugs were recovered in 
the raid on the shipyard, this discovery was significant for two reasons. First, the hull was 
being constructed out of a Kevlar and carbon fiber composite, which was a technological 
improvement over steel hulled vessels encountered prior to this seizure (Popkin, 2011). 
Additionally, many of the component parts, including the engines, were of Chinese 
origin, which raises questions regarding whether or not foreign nations, such as Russia or 
China, or their citizens are actively involved with submersible technology proliferation 
Popkin, 2011). The second reason was that this vessel was a fully submersible vessel that 
was another incremental technological development for the DTOs that operate these 
“drug subs” (Popkin, 2011). Popkin’s article is fairly typical for a media report except 
that it goes into greater technical detail than a typical news agency would.  There are 
numerous articles regarding drug sub seizures that mostly highlight the amount of drugs 
recovered. Very few of these articles provide any substantial academic value to the 
researcher but rather tend to sensationalize the use of these vessels as smuggling 
conveyances. 
One of the most comprehensive threat analyses on submersible vessels was 
completed by Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor in 2008. In “Insurgent 
Submersibles,” Jane’s presents a comprehensive summary of the use of submersible 
vessels by terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Jane’s Terrorism and Security 
Monitor, 2008). Also examined in detail were the SPSS vessels used by DTOs to 
transport large quantities of illegal drugs mostly along the Pacific coast of South and 
Central America as well as Mexico. The article looked at the effectiveness of using these 
vessels as both a means of transportation as an offensive weapon (Jane’s Terrorism and 
Security Monitor, 2008). 
Jane’s also examines the technological innovations that have occurred over the 
past few years with regards to vessel construction. There are a few other threat products 
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available to law enforcement and/or government agencies that are not classified but are 
restricted in access that basically restate the same information but some reports have 
more up to date technical specifications. 
Although there are several national strategies and plans that address maritime 
security, none of them specifically address semi-submersible and/or fully-submersible 
vessels as a maritime security threat. The most relevant strategy for this threat is the DHS 
SVSS that was released in April 2008 (DHS, 2008). The most significant aspect of this 
strategy is the four primary scenarios of gravest concern to HS policymakers. Three out 
of four of these proposed scenarios could be easily accomplished by a submersible vessel. 
For the purposes of this research, most semi-submersibles and minis-submarines used by 
DTOs and terrorist organizations would be considered a small vessel2 due to their size 
and weight. 
Despite the scarcity of literature dealing with small submersibles there is ample 
literature on conventional submarines. This body of knowledge is mature and is 
beneficial to the study of the exploitation of small submersibles by criminal and terrorist 
organizations. Subject areas of interest include submarine technology and development, 
their use as weapons, and the development of anti-submarine warfare. The most relevant 
and significant body of research that addresses the topic of small submarines used as 
weapons is in historical accounts of the evolution of both submersible technology and 
tactics.  For example, Submarines at War (Gunton, 2003) presents a history of 
submersible warfare from the Revolutionary War to the Cold War that provides a basic 
understanding of the development of military submarine technology.  Furthermore, 
Blossoms in the Wind: Human Legacies of the Kamikaze (Shetfall, 2005) addresses the 
development of the tactics used to employ submersibles as suicide weapons. The 
understanding of the development of submarine technology and tactics provides a 
framework for understanding this technology and its potential impact on the homeland 
security enterprise. 
                                                 
2 A small vessel is characterized as any watercraft, regardless of method of propulsion, which is 
generally less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes (DHS, 2008). 
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F. LIMITATIONS 
The major limitations of this study were the sparse amount of data available in 
regards to private submersible ownership and their operation within the territorial waters 
of the U.S., and the scarcity of serious academic research on the use a small submersibles 
by terrorist and criminal organizations.  
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II. HISTORICAL USE OF SMALL SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS AS 
WEAPONS  
A. NATION STATE USE OF SUBMERSIBLES  
Many nation states have effectively used small submersible vessels as instruments 
of warfare for decades. Navies have used the submersible’s tactical advantage of stealth 
to gain military superiority in the maritime domain or to execute clandestine intelligence 
collection missions. The use of submersibles as weapons by nation states can be 
illustrated as a continuous cycle of technological adaptation and escalation. 
Developments in submersible technology and tactics have been both incremental and 
disruptive. Thus, they exert influence on how the threat is countered via innovations in 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology and tactics. This section provides a brief 
historical overview of some of the more significant uses of small submersible vessels by 
sovereign countries. The intent of this section is to provide a condensed framework for 
understanding the origins of the submersible threat. It is not intended to be 
comprehensive historical account of submersible warfare. 
1. Confederate States of America (CSA) 
During the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America (CSA) 
successfully utilized both semi-submersible and fully-submersible vessels during naval 
engagements. David boats were cigar-shaped, steam driven, wooden vessels that rode low 
in the water and were used to ram a spar with a torpedo attached to it into enemy ships. 
Although low in profile, these boats were noisy and easily detected by enemy lookouts. 
In an attempt to break the Union naval blockade, Horace Hunley and James McClintock 
started to develop a fully-submersible vessel for the Confederate navy in Mobile, 
Alabama around 1862. By February 1863, they had successfully launched their third 
attempt at a fully-submersible warship, the H.L. Hunley (Walker, 2005, p. 8). 
The H.L. Hunley was designed to deliver ordnance in a similar manner as the 
David boats, but this new vessel would capitalize on the advantage of increased surprise 
and stealth. On February 17, 1864, the H.L. Hunley set sail near Charleston, South 
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Carolina harbor and proceeded to attack the Union warship the Housatonic. The rebel 
submarine was successful in lodging its spar with a 135 pound torpedo into the 
Housatonic’s hull (Friends of the Hunley, 2010). The charge was successfully detonated 
rendering the Housatonic to be the first ship to be sunk by a submarine attack (Friends of 
the Hunley, 2010). Although the vessel and all hands were mysteriously lost the same 
night, the H.L. Hunley had proven that submersible warfare was indeed viable. Navies 
around the world would now begin to exploit this disruptive technology and at the same 
time attempt to develop countermeasures to this emerging type of asymmetric maritime 
warfare. 
 
Figure 1.  Artist’s Depiction of the H.L. Hunley  
(From Naval History & Heritage Command. n.d) 
2. Japan 
In the later years of World War II, Japan’s naval strategy shifted from an 
offensive focus to a defensive posture. In order to counter an imminent naval invasion of 
the Japanese homeland by U.S. naval forces, Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) war planners 
were in search of tactical innovations that could change the war’s momentum. In late 
1943 (Shetfall 2005, p. 405), two junior Japanese naval officers devised a novel proposal 
to increase the effectiveness of the conventional torpedo. Their idea was to increase the 
size of the warhead and have the torpedo piloted towards its target by a human crew. 
These “human torpedoes” would capitalize on the tactical advantage of stealth by being 
ferried by a mother ship (submarine) and then launch undetected underwater (Shetfall 
2005, p. 405). These vessels were given the name kaiten which is translated as “heaven 
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reverser” or “fate reverser” because of their perceived potential to be able to positively 
impact the war effort (Shetfall 2005, p. 406). The kaitens were intended to 
singlehandedly sink an enemy warship by exchanging the lives of the crew for the benefit 
of the entire Japanese race.  
The IJN developed the kaiten in complete secrecy, and these super weapons were 
an amalgamation of current submarine and torpedo technology. The guidance system 
necessitated the human element to insure the accurate employment of the weapon as 
reliable and accurate self-guided torpedo technology was not yet viable. If a kaiten were 
to miss its target on the first attack run the pilot, in theory, could reposition the vessel for 
a second attack. These manned submersibles were piloted by a crew of one or two and 
could carry a payload of up to 3,417 pounds of high explosives (Historic Naval Ships 
Association, 2008). 
On November 20, 1944, a kaiten was first used in a suicide attack on a U.S war 
ship, and they would be utilized until the end of the war. The success of the weapon is 
debatable as kaitens are only credited with having sunk two U.S Navy ships and the loss 
of 162 American sailors (Historic Naval Ships Association, 2008). Other American ships 
may have been damaged by kaitens, but accurate numbers are not available since some 
were destroyed while being ferried by larger submarines and others may have sunk in 
route to their targets and a kaiten attack could be misinterpreted as a mine or torpedo 
attack.   
Japan’s use of the kaiten is significant because it illustrates how the mash-up of 
submersible technology with the tactic of suicide bombing could be used in an attempt to 
achieve naval strategic objectives (Historic Naval Ships Association, 2008). The 
implication for HS policymakers is that the tactic of using a submersible to conduct a 
modern suicide attack could parallel the development of suicide aviation attacks, which 
discursively evolved from the kamikaze attacks of World War II to the suicide attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Neither the kaiten nor the kamikaze was able to change the outcome 




asymmetrically empowered weapon of the weaker adversary.  The use of submersibles as 
suicides attack vehicles should be a lesson learned for policymakers—as opposed to a 
lesson revisited, as was the case for aviation. 
 
Figure 2.  Japanese Kaiten on Static Display (From Historic Naval Ships Association, 2008) 
3. Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic 
During the Battle of the Atlantic, German submersibles, known as U-Boats, 
played a major strategic role in World War II. After the conclusion of war, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill wrote “The only thing that really frightened me during the 
war was the U-boat peril” (Cleary, 2011). The Battle of the Atlantic was essentially 
protracted economic warfare fought against the British through the use of submarines in 
an attempt to facilitate a naval blockade against Great Britain, thus forcing an early 
conclusion to the war. The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest battle of the war, lasting 
nearly six years. This battle was a classic example of how an instrument of war could be 
classified as emerging technology and disruptive technology at the same time. By the end 
of the World War II, German U-Boats had sunk over 2,900 ships comprising 14 million 
tons of Allied shipping (uboataces, 2011a). Furthermore, 725 of the 1,155 Germany’s U-
Boats had been sunk during the war with 28,744 of the 35,000 sailors killed in combat 
(uboataces, 2011a). The death rate was approximately 82 percent and is the highest 
recorded casualty rate in any modern conflict (uboataces, 2011a). 
The Treaty of Versailles had decreed that German naval forces would be limited 
to 15,000 men, six battleships (no more than 10,000 tons displacement each), six cruisers 
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(no more than 6,000 tons displacement each), 12 destroyers (no more than 800 tons 
displacement each) and 12 torpedo boats (no more than 200 tons displacement each), and 
it completely forbade Germany from possessing submarines (uboataces, 2011b). Because 
of the asymmetric tactical advantages of submarines, Germany secretly defied this treaty 
and began to revitalize its submarine armada prior to the start of World War II 
(uboataces, 2011b). Technology at the time was only incrementally advancing, but the 
development of submarine warfare tactics, such as the Wolfpack or massed attack, and 
the exploitation of the gap in Allied air coverage for maritime convoys resulted in the 
transition to disruptive technology. In turn, Allied military forces were driven to counter 
this disruptive menace by increasing the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
tactics and technology. These developments included longer range aircraft, using aircraft 
on ships, refinement of SONAR and RADAR capabilities, adjusting convoy tactics, 
enhancing the effectiveness of weaponry, and using intelligence, such as code breaking. 
In response to these developments, Germany sought to enhance the technological 
capabilities of the submarine but, due to resource shortages and the Allied bombing 
campaign, the next level of technological innovation was never achieved (uboataces, 
2011b).  
Germany did utilize small submersibles in their submarine fleet but these vessels 
played a significantly smaller role in the war. These midget submarines were smaller and 
comparatively quieter than the larger submarines of the German fleet, which made them 
harder to detect. Due to their light weight, they were also more resistant to depth charge 
attacks. These midget submarines had limited firepower and operational capability. Their 
poor endurance and life support systems rendered them more vulnerable to accidents than 
to enemy fire. During the World War II, Germany built almost 1000 midget submarines 
that were primarily intended for the coastal defense and to operate against allied shipping 
in Europe and the English Channel (uboataces, 2011c).  
Between January 1945 and April 1945, Germany’s most successful midget 
submarine model, the Seehund, conducted 142 missions against Allied shipping 
(uboataces, 2011d). These midget submarine attacks resulted in the sinking of 8 ships 
comprising 17,301 tons of Allied shipping while sustaining a loss of 35 submarines 
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(uboataces, 2011d). Although the tactical successes of these midget submarines were 
small, they were strategically successful because Allied ships and planes were diverted 
from other areas of the war to concentrate on this threat (uboataces, 2011d).  
4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commissioned the construction of a self-
propelled semi-submersible vessel in the 1950s. Capitalizing on the vessel’s low 
silhouette and quietness, the CIA found utility in the use of a SPSS as a clandestine 
infiltration/exfiltration platform. The vessel was 19 feet long and constructed of wood 
and aluminum with plywood sheathing on the bottom, sides, and deck (CIA Semi-
Submersible, 2011). This type of construction was thought to minimize possible detection 
by RADAR and SONAR. It had a crew of two to three persons and could transport an 
additional 120 pounds of equipment a range of approximately 110 miles (CIA Semi-
Submersible, 2011). This SPSS could also be purposely sunk in depths of up to 30 feet 
for three to four weeks before being retrieved (CIA Semi-Submersible, 2011).  
The CIA’s success in using a SPSS to covertly deliver personnel into littoral 
environments demonstrates that the technology has proven itself to be useful for several 
reasons. Semi-submersible technology is less complicated to construct and operate than 
fully-submersible technology so there are advantages in cost and reduced operational 
complexity. The stealth advantage of these vessels makes their use very attractive to 
nation states and, for the same reasons, to criminal and terrorist organizations. This is an 
example of a successful 1950s technological innovation that is still in use today by nation 
states and criminal organizations. The origin and use of small semi-submersible vessels is 
part of the innovation cycle that has the potential to allow entities to further refine this 
technology and eventually develop effective fully-submersible capabilities.  
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Figure 3.  CIA SPSS Vessel on Static Display (From CIA Unveils James Bond-Worthy Spy 
Tech, 2011) 
5. North Korea 
Although no longer on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, North Korea poses a significant threat to the geographic, political, and 
economic stability of Asia. North Korea and South Korea are still technically at war with 
each other, and tensions between the two nation states continue to be disruptive to the 
region. North Korea operates a fleet of semi-submersible vessels and fully-submersible 
midget subs in additional to more conventional submarines and surface craft. These 
submersibles have covert infiltration/exfiltration capabilities as well as the ability to 
launch torpedoes against naval targets (SSI Small Submersible, 2011).  
The North Korean government has demonstrated the intent and capability to use 
submersibles to conduct unprovoked, offensive operations against South Korean vessels. 
On March 26, 2010, a North Korean midget submarine launched a single torpedo that 
sank the South Koren naval vessel, the Cheonan, which resulted in the death of 46 
crewmembers (BBC News Asia-Pacific, 2010). The South Korean response to this 
incident was anemic and no overt military retaliatory action was ever initiated against 
North Korea. These two nations are technically still at war with each other, but observe a 
fragile truce so this incident could be classified an act of war. This effectiveness of this 
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attack, the difficulty in determining the true perpetrator, and the lack of proportional 
response could serve to promote the offensive use of submersibles by other nation states, 
such as Iran, or terrorist groups that have access to submersible technology.   
This attack also demonstrates how technological innovations in under water 
weaponry have increased the effectiveness submersible attacks.  The Cheonan was sunk 
with only one torpedo that carried an estimated 200 to 300 kilograms of high explosives 
(Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS “Cheonan,” 2010). It appears that the 
torpedo detonated prior to contacting the Cheonan’s hull. This tactic is designed to 
capitalize of the shockwave and bubble effect of an underwater explosion, thus reducing 
the warhead size and number of weapons needed to sink a large vessel targets 
(Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS “Cheonan,” 2010).  
This has significant implications for the use of submersibles as improvised 
subsurface weapons.  On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked via a 
conventional boat loaded with approximately the same amount of high explosives used in 
the torpedo that sunk the Cheonan (Sniffen, 2000). Although the USS Cole was about 200 
feet longer than the Cheonan, the increased effectiveness of an underwater explosion as 
opposed to a surface attack cannot be discounted. In addition, it may result in the use of 
submersibles being used as the weapon of choice to commit grand acts of maritime 
terrorism. Although there are many factors involved in an underwater explosion that are 
beyond the scope of this paper, the prospect of using submersibles for underwater attacks 
has historical precedence and must be explored.  
In addition to the attack on the USS Cole, two other suicide surface vessel attacks 
were carried out against the oil tankers Limburg and M Star by al Qaida operatives. These 
three attacks all used a single small boat to carry out a waterborne improvised explosive 
devices (WBIED) suicide attack against a much larger ship but none resulted in the 
sinking of any of the target vessels. 
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Figure 4.  Damage to the Cheonan from a Torpedo Detonation (From CNO Visits ROKS 
Cheonan Memorial, 2013) 
 
Figure 5.  Damage to the USS Cole from a WBIED Attack (From Sutton, 2011) 
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6. Iran 
Iran is a nation state that is currently on the U.S. State Department’s list of state 
sponsors of terrorism (U.S. State Department, 2012).  Currently, Iran operates mini-subs 
and low-profile torpedo boats as part of its naval forces. These mini-subs could be used 
against civilian and military shipping in the Straits of Hormuz to stop or significantly 
impede the flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf. Iran initially purchased mini-subs from 
North Korea but has since developed the organic capability to manufacture them 
domestically (Pappalardo, 2010). 
This is an example of how the proliferation of submersible technology has 
transpired to give developing nations an offensive capability that they were not able to 
develop on their own. Submersible technology has become a market commodity that is 
subject to economic factors such as economies of scale and supply and demand forces. 
North Korea and Iran both have the intent and the capability to use this technology in the 
furtherance of their strategic objectives.  
Iran could further complicate the maritime security of other nations by facilitating 
the cross-pollination of technology, possibly through intermediaries such as Hezbollah, to 
other nations that share their ideology and/or hatred of Western culture. Iran has been 
experiencing increasingly harsh economic sanctions and the illicit market for submersible 
technology could provide a lucrative source of revenue. Additionally, if Iran were to 
provide submersible technology to a drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Central 
America in exchange for cash, it would receive the secondary benefit of contributing to 
an action that would ultimately cause harm to the United States without having to 
actually commit and overt act. 
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Figure 6.  Iranian Ghadir Class Mini-Subs (From Iran Launches Four New Home-Made 
Mini Submarines, 2010) 
B. TERRORIST AND INSURGENT USE OF SUBMERSIBLES 
Just as nation states have used submersibles to achieve military objectives or to 
fulfill intelligence collection requirements, some terrorist groups and insurgencies have 
also sought to obtain submersible technology.  The submersible platform is ideally suited 
to conducting asymmetric warfare and would be attractive to any terrorist organization 
with a maritime nexus. This section proves brief overview of some of the more 
significant instances of terrorist and insurgent use of submersible technology.  
1. American War of Independence 
The 13 British Colonies in North America utilized unconventional tactics to 
conduct an insurgency campaign against the nation of Great Britain. The tactics 
employed against a vastly superior enemy by the Colonists were radical departures from 
normal military doctrine; thus, these freedom fighters were considered terrorists. The 
American rebels adopted many asymmetric warfare tactics and were the first to use a 
submersible vessel to conduct a naval attack. David Bushnell, a scientist, developed the 
fully-submersible Turtle to deliver and attach a 150 lb. mine containing black powder to 
the hull of a British ship.  On September 6, 1776, volunteer Sergeant Ezra Lee conducted 
the first ever submersible combat mission against the British flag ship HMS Eagle in New 
York harbor (Gunton, 2003, p. 10).  The Turtle was egg-shaped and made of wood and 
was operated by hand-cranked propellers and foot pedals that controlled ballast. This and 
 20 
two other attempts at submersible attacks by the Turtle were unsuccessful in sinking any 
enemy ships but these actions changed naval warfare forever (Dunmore, 2002, p. 13–15).  
Although tactically unsuccessful and technologically crude, this innovation solidified the 
submersible as a viable weapon system nearly 237 years ago.  
 
Figure 7.  Replica of the Fist Submersible Combatant Vessel the Turtle (From The 
Submarine Turtle, n.d) 
2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
In the late 1990s, the largest guerilla organization in the Philippines, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), attempted to purchase a complete mini-submarine from 
the nation of North Korea.  The MILF have ties to al Qaida, and this attempt was part of 
ongoing arms sales from North Korea to the MILF (Report: North Korea Armed Islamic 
Group in Philippines, 2005). It was reported that the MILF had actually paid $1 million 
of the $2.2 million price tag to North Korea as a down payment on the mini-sub 
(Schippert, 2006). This transaction was interrupted when details were uncovered by U.S. 
intelligence efforts and pressure was applied to the North Koreans by the United States to 
abort the deal (Schippert, 2006). 
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Although the MILF’s efforts were unsuccessful, this scenario indicates how easy 
it may be for terrorist groups to obtain submersible technology from a country that 
supports terrorism. Countries that support terrorism, either directly or indirectly, are often 
the subject of economic sanctions and the opportunity to obtain funds from the selling of 
arms can be an attractive venture. Additionally, countries that support terrorism may be 
more inclined to share submersible technology with terrorist organizations out of a 
mutual hatred for a common enemy. The proliferation of submersible technology is a 
very serious threat that can quickly bolster an adversary’s maritime capability in a very 
short time span. This danger does not necessarily mean that a country would only have to 
sell a complete submersible to a terrorist group to have a major impact on a group’s 
capabilities, but this proliferation of technology can come from providing technical 
assistance and training, submersible components and parts, and communication and 
navigation equipment.  
3. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 
In 2011, Columbian authorities confiscated two submersibles belonging to the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) in the jungles near Columbia’s 
Pacific coast (Cullinan, 2011). These submersibles were estimated to be worth 
approximately $2 million each due largely to the sophisticated communication and 
navigation equipment that was found onboard (Colombians Seize $2M FARC Drug 
Submarine, 2011). It was estimated that these vessels could carry a crew of five, transport 
approximately seven to 10 tons of illegal drug cargo, and remain submerged for up to 10 
days at a depth of 16.5 feet (Colombians Seize $2M FARC Drug Submarine, 2011). 
There have been other semi-submersibles and fully-submersible vessels captured in 
Columbia. Although it is unknown if these had any ties to the FARC, the possibility 
remains valid. 
It remains unclear whether or not the FARC actually made or obtained these 
submersibles and if they were actually intending on operating them, selling them, or 
merely guarding them. The FARC have been known to cultivate drugs to finance their 
operations (Vargas, 1999); therefore, this would be a departure from their usual modus 
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operandi since the submersibles are used further in the distribution chain beyond 
Columbia’s borders. It would appear that the FARC’s involvement with submersibles 
was motivated by financial gain, and that they were not intended to be used as tactical 
weapons against the government of Columbia. The capture of these vessels could indicate 
that there is a growing secondary market for submersible technology in South and Central 
America and that there continues to be significant intelligence gaps. 
4. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
The Sri Lankan militant separatist group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), is another example of a terrorist group with aspirations for using submersible 
technology. There is no open source report that the LTTE ever used a submersible to 
attack Sri Lankan forces; however, several underwater vehicles, in various states of 
completion, have been captured in LTTE clandestine camps. In one operation, the Sri 
Lankan army raided a jungle ship building facility that contained a 35-foot long, armor-
plated underwater vehicle and various other smaller submersibles (Preuss, 2009). These 
vessels appeared to be capable of fully-submersible operation and could have been used 
to transport weapons and personnel or to be outfitted as a submersible WBIED (Preuss, 
2009). 
The LTTE was the first terrorist group to use the tactic of suicide bombing, and 
this weapon was frequently utilized by their maritime branch, the Sea Tigers. If the LTTE 
had been allowed to continue develop its underwater capability, it is reasonable to project 
that these submersibles could have been used in suicide attacks against Sri Lankan naval 
targets. This would have been a recombining of technology and tactics to produce an 
extremely disruptive innovation not seen since World War II. This would make this tactic 
extremely attractive to other groups seeking to inflict maximum damage to maritime 
targets such as surface vessels while avoiding surface defenses.  
C. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION’S (DTO’S) USE OF 
SUBMERSIBLES 
DTOs in South and Central America have been using various submersibles as part 
of their illicit drug distribution network since the early to mid-1990s. It is speculated that 
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as aviation and marine interdiction efforts by law enforcement and military forces 
became increasingly effective that DTOs began to adapt their tactics. The natural 
technological evolution in smuggling operations was the rejection of speed in favor of 
stealth (Popkin, 2011). These early attempts were crude and were not capable of self-
propulsion. These submersible contraptions were towed behind fishing trawlers in an 
attempt to avoid detection even if the trawler was boarded. In 1999, a more sophisticated 
“narco-torpedo” was developed and entered service. Although these “narco-torpedoes” 
were still a towed apparatus the level of technical sophistication was increasing. Their 
shape transitioned from crude contraptions to a finned, dart-shaped tube outfitted with 
radio transponders to aid in their recovery in the event they had to be discarded (Popkin, 
2011). 
The next technological development was the development of the self-propelled 
semi-submersible or SPSS platform. Fishing trawlers used to tow the “narco-torpedoes” 
were easily detectable, and they could be interdicted if suspected of illicit activity. The 
transition to a fully autonomous semi-submersible vessel was an attempt to capitalize on 
the increased stealth capabilities of the SPSS. This transition was also partially fueled by 
the increasing availability of sophisticated navigation and communication systems such 
as Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation equipment. The major technical 
characteristics of a typical drug running SPSS are: 
• Dimensions: 40–80 feet in length with a freeboard (exposed area above 
the waterline) of approximately 18 inches. 
• Composition: Fiberglass/wood or steel. Usually takes upwards of 1 yr to 
build.  
• Propulsion: Self-propelled; single or twin diesel engines; 1500 or more 
gallon fuel capacity. 
• Speed: 6+ knots. 
• Range: Approx 2,000 miles. 
• Capacity: 4 persons, 4 to 12 metric tons of cocaine.  
• Control: Human or Remote Control. 
• Cost: Approx $2 million (USD). (Joint Interagency Task Force South, 
2008) 
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In the complex adaptive environment of drug smuggling, nothing remains static 
for very long, and authorities began to learn how to detect and interdict SPSSs. Effort 
was then made to reduce the vessels infrared signature by directing exhaust pipes into the 
water and the exteriors were painted blue in order to match the color of the ocean. In an 
attempt to avoid confiscation, SPSS were outfitted with sophisticated valve systems that 
allowed their crews to scuttle their vessel within minutes of detection. The motivation in 
scuttling the SPSS in the event of detection was that if no drugs could be recovered from 
the vessel then the crew would not be charged with narcotics trafficking. A SPSS is 
typically only used once so this innovation has dual purpose as the vessel will be scuttled 
when its mission is complete (Kraul, 2008).  
These technological advances were the result of escalation and adaptation in the 
realm of drug trafficking and mirror the same processes that were emerging during the 
Battle of the Atlantic. In both the Battle of the Atlantic and the current “war of drugs,” 
strategy drives technological innovations and thus tactics. As an adversary develops 
tactical efficiencies derived from technology, then its opponent is forced to innovate to 
counter these efficiencies. As long as both parties are willing and capable of pursuing 
their strategic objectives, then this duel of innovation will continue to manifest itself. 
These SPSS technical innovations seemed to be internally derived, but there is 
some evidence that DTOs were attempting to leverage submersible technology from 
external sources. For example, in September 2000, Columbian police found a partially 
completed fully-submersible submarine about 350 miles from the Columbia’s Pacific 
coast (Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2008). The vessel was 30 meters long and 
had an estimated cargo capacity of 200 tons (Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 
2008). According to evidence obtained from the scene, this submersible was being 
constructed with the use of Russian technology and the efforts of Russian and U.S. naval 
engineers (Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2008). It is unknown whether these 
naval engineers were military and/or civilian personnel. Police were able to link the subs 
construction to Cali’s North of the Valley drug cartel, which was known to have close 
ties to Russian organized crime (Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2008). This  
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incident is another example of how the proliferation of submersible technology can be 
used to give criminal organizations and terrorist groups accelerated technological 
advantages in the submersible arena.  
As illustrated in the above example, DTOs continue their quest for fully-
submersible vessels in order to insure the reliability and the effectiveness of their supply 
chain operations. A self-propelled, fully-submersible or SPFS capability would allow 
drug traffickers to operate virtually undetected along the coasts of Central and South 
America. In another example, on July 2, 2010, authorities in Ecuador confiscated a nearly 
completed 74-foot fully-submersible submarine made of Kevlar and carbon fiber 
(Popkin, 2011). In addition, it utilized Chinese diesel engines on the water’s surface and 
battery-powered electric motors when submerged. The 249 lead-acid batteries could 
allow the sub to travel silently underwater for up to 18 hours before having to recharge 
(Popkin, 2011). Furthermore, the vessel was configured for a crew of four to six and 
could dive to depths of 62 feet (Popkin, 2011). The sub’s estimated maximum operational 
range was 6,800 nautical miles on the surface, and it could sail for 10 days before having 
to refuel (Popkin, 2011). Additionally, the vessel was outfitted with a GPS chart plotter 
with side-scan capabilities, a high-frequency radio, an electro-optical periscope, and an 
infrared camera mounted on the five-foot high conning tower (Popkin, 2011). Finally, 
this sub is estimated to have cost $5 million to build and its cargo capacity was estimated 
at approximately nine tons of cocaine that would be worth about $250 million3 on the 
streets of the U.S. (Popkin, 2011). 
 
                                                 
3 1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms = 1,000,000 grams x 9 = 12,000,000 grams/submersible. In 2007, the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimated that the average retail price of a gram of pure cocaine being sold 
in the U.S. to be $118.70. The total retail value of a single nine metric ton shipment of cocaine would be 
estimated to be approximately $1,068,300,000. Source: Cocaine Price/Purity Analysis of STRIDE Data. 
(n.d.). 
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III. PRIVATELY OWNED AND OPERATED SUBMERSIBLES  
A. THE PRIVATE SUBMARINE COMMUNITY   
Innovations in submersible technology have spawned new uses for submarines 
and have made them available to more people than any other time in history. As 
submersible technology matures, the barriers to engage this technology dissipate resulting 
in increased global access to submarines by groups and individuals. This new 
accessibility to submersibles has fostered new applications and markets that were 
inconceivable even just a few years ago. The trend in submersible technology has been 
largely been incremental, but submersible technology is being recombined in ways that 
are potentially disruptive and have the capability to change the equilibrium of the 
maritime transportation system in both positive and negative ways. 
At one point in time, the concept of the average citizen owning and operating a 
personal submarine would have made a great subject for a science fiction story, but this is 
a new reality that HS policymakers must accept. An unknown number of privately owned 
submarines are operating within the territorial waters of the U.S., and they vary a great 
deal in regards to availability, price, and technical capabilities. Private subs can be found 
in a variety of locations and are used for many different purposes. There are some very 
specific market segments for private submarines such as luxury, tourist, working, 
research, and recreational. An example of a specific population of privately owned 
submarines is colleges, universities, and research institutes that study the subsurface 
marine environment. Additionally, marine salvage companies and oil rig service 
providers use private submarines in the course of the commercial maintenance services 
that they provide. 
Some privately owned submersibles are owned operated by commercial tour 
companies and resorts that give paying passengers the opportunity of viewing underwater 
environments.  The first true tourist submarine was the Auguste Piccard, was built in 
Switzerland in the early 1960s (Committee on Assessing Passenger Submersible Safety, 
1990, p. 2). This vessel carried 40 passengers and a crew of four up to depths of 820 feet 
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in Lake Geneva. Between 1964 and 1965, the Auguste Piccard carried 32,000 paying 
passengers on 1,112 dives (Committee on Assessing Passenger Submersible Safety, 
1990, p. 2). In addition, the first commercial passenger submarine in U.S. waters initiated 
operations in 1987 in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S. Coast Guard, 1993). As of 
1996, there were 48 purpose built tourist subs and seven converted deep submersibles 
operating world-wide carrying an estimated two million passengers annually. (U.S. 
Submarines, 1996). In 1989, there were seven tourist submersibles operating in U.S. 
waters, which was the largest number under a single national jurisdiction (Committee on 
Assessing Passenger Submersible Safety, 1990, p.1). As of January 2012, a query of the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) 
database indicated a total federally registered population of approximately two dozen 
submersible or submarine type vessels in the United States4 although not all may be 
currently in operation.  
 
Figure 8.  Privately Owned Tourist Submersible  
(From Atlantis Submarine off Maui, Hawaii, n.d.) 
                                                 
4 The Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) is a database system managed 
and used by the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The MISLE is used to store various data on vessels 
and facilities (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012). 
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One of the most intriguing and least understood populations of personal subs in 
the U.S. is the private submarine enthusiast segment of the recreational boating 
community. These personal pleasure craft can range in price from millions of dollars for 
a luxury yacht-type sub to a few thousand dollars for a basic “do-it-yourself” project. 
These personal submarines can be either home built in a garage from scratch or can be 
commercially purchased as off-the-shelf completely operational submersible vessels. 
There are clubs and organizations devoted to the hobby of personal submarine 
construction, ownership, and operation. The motto from one such organization, known as 
the Personal Submersible Organization,5 is “To promote and encourage discussion of 
safety, design, construction, and operation of Personal Submersibles” (Personal 
Submersible Organization, 2012). 
These clubs seem to be primarily focused upon sharing and promoting the hobby 
of submersible construction and operation rather than being a lobbying or representative 
organization as there is no current effort to restrict or regulate these vessels. The growing 
popularity and availability of personal submarines is a weak signal that homeland 
security policymakers should closely monitor as it could have significant implications for 
the safety and security of the maritime transportation system (MTS) if this technology 
were exploited for nefarious purposes.  
B. REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLE (ROV) TECHNOLOGY 
Technology in the maritime environment is rapidly advancing, and the use of 
remotely operated vehicles (ROV) is another area for examination with regards to 
submersibles. ROVs have been controlled by tethered cables for many years, but 
technology now allows for wireless remote control. The Protector is an unmanned 
surface vessel (USV) developed in Israel for maritime anti-terrorism missions. This 
unmanned vessel is controlled via secure data links and can transmit video and other data 
back to the operator. The Protector’s operator can employ weapons while being located 
                                                 
5 In 2011, the Personal Submersible Organization was comprised of 53 active members (Popkin, 
2011). 
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safely miles from the incident. The use of this type of technology to control submersibles 
may not be fully viable yet, but it is a trend to be monitored (Hanlon, 2006).  
Additionally, the use of radio controlled technology could also eliminate the need 
for a submersible pilot and crew. Although technologically crude, small radio controlled 
submarines are currently available from hobby shops and this technology could be 
exploited in the future to turn a remotely operated submersible into an unmanned guided 
weapon. These hobbyist submersibles can be ordered with still and/or video cameras that 
would allow for the underwater reconnaissance of maritime critical infrastructure/key 
resource (MCI/KR) by individuals with ill intent (Tower Hobbies, 2012). In addition, the 
progression of DTO submersible technology is moving towards developing SPSS/SPFS 
vessels that are fully remotely operated, which would eliminate the need to recruit crews 
for these smuggling missions (Columbian Narcosubs, 2009). 
 
Figure 9.  Remotely Operated Thunder Tiger Neptune SB-1 Submarine (From Tower 
Hobbies, 2012) 
C. UNREGULATED VS. REGULATED VESSELS 
On July 20, 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard released Navigation and Vessel 
Inspection Circular (NVIC)6 No. 5-93 entitled “Guidance for Certification of Passenger 
                                                 
6 a navigation and vessel inspection circular (NVIC) provides detailed guidance about the enforcement 
or compliance with a certain Federal marine safety regulations and U.S. Coast Guard marine safety 
programs. While NVICs are non-directive, meaning that they do not have the force of law, they are 
important “tools” for complying with the law (U.S. Coast Guard, 2011). 
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Carrying Submersibles.” This NVIC provides tourist submarine manufactures and 
operators a frame of reference for certification procedures under Title 46, Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR), Subchapter T, Small Passenger Vessels (under 100 gross 
tons).  This document defines when a private submersible is required to be regulated 
under the CFRs and when one is not. Basically, any submersible vessel under 100 gross 
tons that that carries more than six  passengers for hire will be subject to 46 CFR, 
Subchapter T (U.S. Coast Guard, 1993). The implication for this is that these vessels 
must be inspected by the USCG, and the operator must be licensed by the USCG. The 
licensing process requires that the mariner undergo a background check and hold a 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)7 card. It should be noted that 
private submersibles could be built larger than 100 gross tons and thus would be subject 
to additional provisions of 46 CFR and 33 CFR Part 104 of the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) of 2002.8 
Submersibles under 100 gross tons that are used for private recreational purposes 
are not subject to federal regulation but must comply with 33 CFR, Subchapter S (boating 
safety regulations for federal waters). These regulations require that a recreational 
submarine be numbered in accordance with the federal numbering system or the 
numbering system of the state where the vessel will be mainly operated. Additionally, 
these vessels must also comply with federal and/or state boating regulations with regards 
to carrying safety equipment such as life preservers, sound producing devices, visual 
distress signals, and compliance with marine pollution regulations (U.S. Coast Guard, 
1993). Operators of these uninspected vessels are not required to have a license unless 
                                                 
7 TWIC was established by Congress through the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and 
is administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Coast Guard. TWICs are 
tamper-resistant biometric credentials issued to workers who require unescorted access to secure areas of 
ports, vessels, outer continental shelf facilities and all credentialed merchant mariners (Transportation 
Security Administration, 2012). 
8 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) is designed to protect the nation’s ports 
and waterways from a terrorist attack. This law is the U.S. equivalent of the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (ISPS) and was fully implemented on July 1, 2004. It requires vessels and port 
facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security plans that may include passenger, 
vehicle, and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel 
identification procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment. By 
creating a consistent security program for all our nation’s ports, we are better able to identify and deter 
threats (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.). 
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required by state law. Furthermore, no federal background check or TWIC card is 
required to own or operate a recreational submersible.  
Since private submersibles are generally unregulated and can be purchased by just 
about anyone, there is a potential marine safety implication regarding their ownership and 
operation. The use of these vessels by incompetent or reckless persons could pose a 
significant hazard to marine navigation.  The negligent operation of a submersible could 
lead to a collision that could result in a major marine casualty. The results of a collision 
with a submersible could be far worse for a ship than if the ship had collided with a 
surface vessel because most of the damage would occur below the ship’s waterline. The 
local USCG Captain of the Port (COTP)9 can impose local operating restrictions on these 
recreational subs relative to navigation safety, port safety and security, and vessel traffic 
considerations; however, the COPT must have awareness of the existence an operation of 
these vessels in order to take prudent and timely action (U.S. Coast Guard, 1993).   
D. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS (MDA) 
According to the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), 
the definition of the maritime domain is “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, 
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances” (The White House, 2005, p. ii). MDA is defined as “the effective 
understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the 
security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States” (The White House, 2005, 
p. ii). Having a complete understanding of what is happening in the maritime domain is 
essential for effective and efficient strategic, tactical, and operational planning and 
decision making.  
Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) only captures data 
on regulated submersibles and does not have data on the population of recreational subs 
in operation. Since most personal subs are not regulated and state and federal records are 
                                                 
9 The Captain of the Port (COTP) is designated by the Commandant of the Coast Guard to enforce 
regulations for the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities; anchorages; 
bridges; safety and security zones; and ports and waterways (Captain of the Port, n.d.). 
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sparse, there is no central database or other information management tool that can 
accurately state how many recreational submersibles are owned and operated within the 
territorial waters of the U.S. Without an accurate census of these vessels, it is impossible 
to estimate any potential risks associated with them. With regards to privately owned 
submersible vessels in the U.S., there is a serious gap with regards to achieving a level of 
MDA useful to homeland security policymakers. Unless policymakers can obtain 
meaningful data in regards to privately owned submersibles, it will be virtually 
impossible to estimate any potential threat that they pose or where the maritime 
transportation system is vulnerable (The White House, 2005, p. 1). 
E. PRICE AND AVAILABILITY 
Completely functioning personal subs are available from a variety of sources, or 
they can be built from scratch using complete plans purchased on the internet. There are 
several companies that deal in the manufacture and sale of new and used submersibles for 
many of the existing market segments. Some of these companies will even provide 
submersibles for charter. Most of these companies require that the purchaser obtain 
training on how to operate the submersibles that they provide before completing the sale. 
Submersibles can also be purchased from private owners just as used cars, boats, or 
airplanes. Submersibles are becoming more affordable and thus more available to a larger 
segment of the public. For a new tourist submarine venture, it is estimated that a 48-
passenger submarine would cost approximately $3.7 million in 1996 with an additional 
$2 million needed in additional start-up expenditures (U.S. Submarines, 1996). The 
following examples (Figures 10–15) are used to demonstrate the variety of some of the 
private submersibles currently available for purchase. These examples are for academic 




Figure 10.  Marion Submarine-Powerboat (From Kamakshi, 2010) 
Name: Marion Submarine-Powerboat 
Type: Fully-Submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum surface speed 40 knots; maximum surface range 500 
miles, and maximum diving depth of 250 feet.  
Cost: $ 3.5 million (USD) (Kamakshi, 2010) 
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Figure 11.  Fully-Submersible Tour Sub (From International VentureCraft Corp, 2011b) 
Name: Tour Sub 
Type: Fully-Submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum diving depth of 40 feet. Features an Auto-Hover system, 
built-in SONAR, Fly-By-Wire Joystick, Electronic Buoyancy Control, and 
Electrical Systems Monitor. 
Cost: $ 350,000 (USD) (International VentureCraft Corp. 2011b) 
 36 
 
Figure 12.  Seabreacher Semi-Submersible Vessel (From Seabreacher, 2010) 
Name: Seabreacher 
Type: Semi-submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum surface speed 40 knots; maximum sub-surface speed 
knots; and maximum diving depth of six feet for brief durations.  
Cost: $65,000 (USD) (Seabreacher, 2010) 
 
Figure 13.  Fully-Submersible SportSub III (From International VentureCraft Corp, 2011a) 
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Name: SportSub III 
Type: Fully-Submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum diving depth of 130 feet. Features include a Fly-By-Wire 
Joystick, Electronic Buoyancy Control, and Electrical Systems Monitor. 
Cost: $ 59,000 (USD) (International VentureCraft Corp, 2011a) 
 
Figure 14.  Fully-Submersible K-350 “Lake Diver” (From Personal Submersibles 
Organization, 2012b) 
Name: Kittredge Model K-350 “Lake Diver” 
Type: Fully-Submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum diving depth of 350 feet. Includes side-scan sonar, 
hydrophone, gyro-compass, emergency buoy, and O2 thru-hull fittings and 
portable O2 meter.  
Cost: $45,000 (USD) (Personal Submersibles Organization, 2012b) 
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Figure 15.  Semi-Submersible AquaSub (From AquaSub: A One-Man Sports Submarine, 
2010) 
Name: AquaSub 
Type: Semi-Submersible  
Capabilities: Maximum diving depth of 40 inches.  
Cost: $45(USD) for complete plans. Estimated construction cost is approximately 
$2,000 (USD). (AquaSub: A One-Man Sports Submarine, 2010) 
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IV. RISK: VULNERABILITIES, THREATS, & CONSEQUENCES 
The terrorist use of a small submersible vessel to conduct a maritime attack 
against the United States would have to be considered a classic “black swan” event 
(Taleb, 2010). The use of a private submarine to conduct a high consequence terrorist 
attack is highly improbable but not impossible, and thus this scenario warrants attention 
from HS policymakers. A submersible attack perpetrated against the MTS would 
constitute an incident of national significance (IONS)10 and would require huge amounts 
of resources for response, mitigation, and recovery efforts.  Furthermore, due to 
limitations in MDA, it would be impossible to predict such an attack, and a successful 
attack would have a massive negative impact on the MTS. In addition, the overall shock 
value would be stunning because most people could never conceive of such an event 
occurring in the maritime domain.  
The development and evolution of the semi-submersible and fully-submersible 
vessel use by terrorists is an incremental innovation in technology that has been occurring 
over hundreds of years. Submersible technology has the potential to quickly morph into a 
disruptive and destructive innovation if the technology is applied for the attainment of 
terrorist objectives. This continuous cycle in asymmetric warfare of the incremental use 
of technology and innovation by both terrorists and those organizations opposed to them 
in an effort to defeat each other’s respective tactics is known as “incrementalism” (Buky, 
2007). Currently, there is no specific MHS strategy or plan to address incrementalism as 
it relates to the submersible threat. 
An analogy can be made between the private use of small submersibles by 
terrorists to the events experienced by the aviation community on September 11, 2001. 
Initially aviation was a disruptive technology but gradually settled into an incremental 
phase of development. Even the use of aircraft as weapons of war was incremental in 
nature until World War II when the Japanese employed the use of suicide pilots known as 
                                                 
10 IONS are high-impact events that require an extensive and well-coordinated multiagency response 
to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term recovery (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d. b). 
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the kamikaze. This disruptive innovation was impossible to predict, had massive impact, 
and was stunning—a classic black swan scenario. Unfortunately, this tactic was all but 
forgotten until on September 11, 2001 when four civilian airliners were used to inflict 
massive damage upon the United States resulting in a black swan event.  
The use of submersible vessels as weapons has been incremental from the 
Revolutionary War until World War II when the Japanese employed the use of suicide 
mini-submarines known as the kaiten. This maritime attack mode mimicked the kamikaze 
attacks but did not rise to the level of a black swan event. This may be due in part to two 
factors, the first one was that kaiten attacks were less numerous than kamikaze attacks 
and thus resulted in fewer successful attacks (Ishiguro, 2009; Historic Naval Ships 
Association, 2008; World War II in the Pacific, 2009). The second contributing factor 
may be that many kamikaze attacks were filmed by combat photographers allowing the 
American public to see these attacks in their local movie theaters, which provided a 
visual context for understanding the effectives and impact of this tactic. Due to the 
capability of technology to project images, video, and audio almost instantaneously to the 
entire world, the tactic of using a submersible as a suicide weapon of mass effect has the 
potential to be a black swan event just as the terrorist exploitation of civilian aviation 
assets was in September 2001. The challenge for the HSE is to quantify and then mitigate 
the risk posed from submersible technology. 
A. RISK 
Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or 
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. 
Additionally, it is the potential for an adverse outcome assessed as a function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an incident, event, or occurrence and 
may manifest at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In order to understand risk 
as it relates to the use of a submersible to conduct a terrorist attack, both threats and 
vulnerabilities must be examined and analyzed (DHS, 2010, p. 27).   
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B. VULNERABILITIES 
The definition of vulnerability is a physical feature or operational attribute that 
renders an entity, asset, system, network, or geographic area open to exploitation or 
susceptible to a given hazard (DHS, 2010, p. 38). The extended definition of vulnerability 
is a characteristic of design, location, security posture, operation, or any combination 
thereof, that renders an entity, asset, system, network, or geographic area susceptible to 
disruption, destruction, or exploitation (DHS, 2010, p. 38). 
Since the effectiveness of the maritime transportation system (MTS) is dependent 
upon the freedom of movement of vessels, passengers, and cargo the whole system has 
inherent vulnerability. There must be equilibrium in the system to insure and support both 
system security and the facilitation of commence. Since there is persistent system 
vulnerability, terrorists or criminal organizations can seek to exploit these vulnerabilities 
to further their own causes. Furthermore, system vulnerabilities will dictate what tactics 
are used by terrorists or criminal organizations. The SVSS indicates that small vessels 
could be used to execute four different types of scenarios by terrorists. Of these four 
scenarios, the following are ideally suited to the use of a small submersible in order to 
exploit current MTS vulnerabilities: 
1. Smuggling a WMD in the U.S. 
2. Smuggling a terrorist into the U.S. 
3. Use as a WBIED. (DHS, 2008) 
These three scenarios would be of primary concern to homeland security policymakers 
with in regards to identifying and mitigating the potential threat posed by small 
submersibles. 
C. THREAT 
The DHS Risk Lexicon defines threat as a natural or man-made occurrence, 
individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, 
operations, the environment, and/or property (DHS, 2010, p. 36).  For the purposes of 
assessing risk, the threat of an intentional hazard is generally estimated likelihood of an 
attack that accounts for both intent and capability of an adversary (DHS, 2010, p. 36). In 
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order for the above scenarios to be plausible when considering the potential for a SPSS 
attack, the assumption must be made that an international terrorist organization currently 
possess a WMD and/or WME (i.e., large quantities of explosives) in a region where 
DTOs operate SPSS vessels. Additionally, the assumption must be made that both 
organizations are willing and able to synthesize their individual intent and capabilities to 
form a collaborative threat. 
1. Capability 
Capability is simply the means to accomplish a mission, function, or objective 
(DHS, 2010, p. 9). International drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated that 
they possess the technological means needed to transport a WMD/WME or terrorist via a 
SPSS to the coastal waters of the United States from Central America. Moreover, the 
current fleet of DTO owned SPSS vessels has the necessary range to reach the United 
States, especially if refueling and replenishing can be accomplished during the voyage. 
It should be noted that there are no open source accounts of any semi-submersible 
or fully-submersible vessels operated by DTOs being detected and/or intercepted within 
U.S. waters even though these vessels have that capability. The current tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by these criminal organizations dictate that most 
of these vessels off load their cargoes in Mexican waters. The merchandise is then sub-
dived into smaller parcels for transport to the final U.S. market via the land border 
between the United States and Mexico (Kash & White, 2010). This current supply chain 
structure may be the result of the perception of detection, and thus perceived interdiction, 
by U.S. maritime law enforcement agencies and/or the ease of ground transport across the 
U.S. southwestern land border. SPSS and SPFS vessels operated by DTOs have the 
technical capabilities to form a significant threat against the MHS enterprise, but there 
needs to be an element of hostile intent to inflict damage upon MTS in order to solidify 
the establishment of a credible threat. 
2. Intent 
Intent can be defined as a state of mind or desire to achieve an objective (DHS, 
2010, p. 19).  In the proposed scenario of a DTO owned and operated submersible vessel 
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being used to transport a WMD/WME to the shores of the U.S., HS policymakers must 
assume that a DTO and an international terrorist organization (ITO) must form a 
mutually beneficial relationship. An ITO may clearly intend to deploy the WMD but lack 
the logistical capability to complete the threat formulation. The theory promoted by some 
HS practitioners that is driving such scenario based planning is that these two separate, 
and often conflicted, entities will combine their hostile intent and technical capability to 
formulate a viable and credible submersible threat (Allen, 2007, p. 75; Homeland 
Security Daily Wire, 2008). 
3. Motivation and Ideology 
Members of terrorist groups and criminal organizations are by and large 
committed operatives working collectively to achieve their group’s respective 
organizational objectives.  A terrorist group’s motivations are, in most cases, are based 
entirely on ideology, and their selection of tactics and targets is based upon 
accomplishing strategic objectives that support their core ideological beliefs. In order for 
a terrorist group to achieve an operational victory, it will commit acts of violence to:  
• Produce widespread fear 
• Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause by 
attracting the attention of the media 
• Harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that the 
government overreacts and appears repressive 
• Steal or extort money and equipment, especially weapons and ammunition 
vital to the operation of their group 
• Destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create 
doubt that the government can provide for and protect its citizens 
• Discourage foreign investments, tourism, or assistance programs that can 
affect the target country’s economy and support of the government in 
power 
• Influence government decisions, legislation, or other critical decisions 
• Free prisoners 
• Satisfy vengeance 
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• Turn the tide in a guerrilla war by forcing government security forces to 
concentrate their efforts in urban areas. This allows the terrorist group to 
establish itself among the local populace in rural areas. (Terrorism 
Research, 2012) 
Terrorist groups are not generally motivated to commit violent acts for profit or 
for financial gain. While terrorist groups may engage in crimes that result in financial 
gain, these funding activities are usually used to finance operations that support their 
fundamental ideology and mission accomplishment. The most likely scenario that could 
lead to collusion between a DTO and an ITO would be a cooperative joint venture that 
facilitated financial gain for both entities, such as a narcotics distribution network. This 
type of alliance could lead to some cross pollination of technology as well as TTPs 
between these organizations in order to maximize return on investment (ROI) but 
organizational motivations could preclude full cooperation between them with respect to 
a submersible attack against the MTS. 
A typical DTO’s motivations are purely for financial gain although they 
effectively utilize terrorist tactics in the course of illicit operations. In addition, DTOs are 
criminal organizations that exist to generate profits, and they make strategic, operational, 
and tactical decisions that provide for the best ROI. Violent acts committed by DTOs 
usually support their business models in some way and are based entirely on the ideology 
of greed.  
In order to persuade a DTO to transport a WMD, such as an improvised nuclear 
device (IND), via a submersible for an ITO, there would have to be an overwhelming 
economic advantage for the DTO decision makers. An ITO would most likely have to 
pay a premium price to secure the use of one of these submersible vessels and crews as 
well as logistical support functions. The value of the illicit cargoes carried by 
submersibles can easily exceed $100s of millions U.S. dollars (USD) and at an estimated 
cost of only $1–2 million USD per unit to build there are significant profits to be made 
from the use of a SPSS or SPFS vessel to transport illegal drugs (Joint Interagency Task 
Force South, 2008). This type of revenue stream allows DTOs to continuously upgrade 
their current submersible fleet capability either though internal research and development 
efforts or via the exploitation of currently available submersible technology. Furthermore, 
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DTOs have the necessary resources to outright purchase fully operational submersible 
vessels on the open market, but no open source accounts indicate that this has yet 
happened. It is doubtful that any ITO would have the financial resources necessary to 
charter the use of a drug running SPSS/SPFS for a WMD/WME smuggling mission from 
an established DTO since the opportunity cost of a single voyage could exceed $275 
million USD.11  
Additionally, DTOs may be very reluctant to facilitate a grand act of aggression 
against the U.S. since that is their primary target market for their illicit drugs. It would 
not be a sound and prudent business model to help destroy the primary source of 
consumers of one’s products if the long term objective was sustained profitability. As 
noted earlier, DTOs are reluctant to use submersible vessels to transport illegal drugs 
directly to U.S. waters because of potential detection and interdiction upon entering U.S. 
waters. Transporting a WMD/WME to a U.S. port would be a significant deviation from 
their current TTPs.  
Furthermore, if a WMD attack were to be carried out by the delivery of a weapon 
via a DTO owned/operated submersible, the ominous reality of the retaliatory measures 
surely to be taken by the U.S. government would most likely render this option null and 
void for DTOs because of the negative risk return tradeoff. If there were valid evidence 
that a DTO participated in a major terrorist attack against the homeland of the U.S., a 
swift and decisive military response would certainly materialize, which could 
significantly alter the DTO’s ability to function as it currently does. Moreover, this would 
be an exponential escalation of the “war on drugs” that DTOs would most certainly wish 
to avoid under current circumstances and market conditions. The success of the drone 
attacks against al-Qaeda terrorists and the raid conducted by U.S. special operations 
forces that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden demonstrates to any DTO that the  
 
                                                 
11 According to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) semi-submersible vessels used by 
DTO’s can have a cargo capacity as large as 12 metric tons.  1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms = 1,000,000 
grams x 12 = 12,000,000 grams/submersible. In 2007, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimated that 
the wholesale price of a gram of cocaine being shipped in bulk quantities was $23.04. The total wholesale 
value in 2007 of a single 12 metric ton shipment of cocaine would be estimated to be approximately 
$276,480,000 (Cocaine Price/Purity Analysis of STRIDE Data, n.d.). 
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United States Government (USG) possesses the necessary intent and global capability to 
eliminate any perceived threat, and such actions would result in catastrophic market 
interruptions for the DTOs. 
When examining intent and capability with regards to using a submersible to 
commit an act of terror, there are other potential perpetrators other than ITOs that must be 
considered.  Since submersible technology has reached a point where almost any 
individual could build or buy a submarine, the possibility that a HVE or “lone wolf” actor 
could use one to commit an act of terror is a very real scenario that must be addressed by 
HS policy. This availability provides a HVE with the capability to conduct a submersible 
terrorist attack against high value maritime targets. A maritime attack using a 
submersible vessel could be planned and executed domestically by a single HVE with 
minimal capability and ill intent thus resulting in a meta-threat to the HSE.  
The threat posed by a HVE is significantly different than the threat posed by a 
DTO. The most significant difference is that an unknown HVE often can plan and 
conduct operations without alerting law enforcement, while DTOs are already known to 
law enforcement and intelligence can be collected on them and their operations. 
Additionally, the HVE has the advantage of already being in the country legally while 
DTOs would have to penetrate the USG’s maritime border security in order to 
successfully carry out a submersible attack scenario. 
4. Social Amplification of Risk 
There are psychological theories that could help explain the distortion of the 
perception of the actual threat posed by DTO operated submersible vessels. One possible 
theory to explain this phenomenon is social amplification of risk, which is a distortion of 
the seriousness of a risk caused by public concern about the risk and/or about an activity 
contributing to the risk that can result in public concern with an otherwise insignificant 
risk (DHS, 2010, p. 34). Social amplification of risk can be described as:  
1. The phenomenon by which hazards interact with psychological, social, 
institutional, and cultural processes in ways that may amplify or attenuate 
the public’s perceived level of risk.   
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2. The subject of a field of study that seeks to systematically link the 
technical assessment of risk with sociological perspectives of risk 
perception and risk-related behavior. (DHS, 2010, p. 34) 
The name used to describe these vessels, self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS), 
is technically accurate but somewhat misleading and can cause persons not familiar with 
maritime operations to infer that these vessels have capabilities that they do not actually 
possess (due the effects of social amplification of risk). A technically correct but verbose 
name for a typical small pleasure craft could be a self-propelled non-submersible (SPNS) 
vessel which is technically accurate but verbose. A SPSS is nothing more than a vessel 
that rides lower in the water than a typical boat and has no other special or unique 
attributes. These “low profile signature evading threats” are essentially conventional 
surface craft just like any other boat or ship but that are described by the use of acronyms 
and potentially misleading nomenclature (e.g., SPSS) (Kash & White, 2010). This 
psychological phenomenon can be described as a conceptual metaphor or cognitive 
metaphor that is the attempt to form a framework of understanding of one idea in terms of 
another idea or concept (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
The major difference between semi-submersibles and conventional vessels is the 
amount of the vessel’s hull residing above the waterline. A larger portion of an SPSS’s 
hull will be below the surface of the water when compared and contrasted to other 
conventional vessels. This is a major attribute of its stealth capability and resulting 
tactical advantage. This reduced visual profile makes detecting the SPSS vessel more 
difficult, but not impossible, than higher riding conventional craft. Other than speed and 
operational capabilities SPSSs are essentially the same as conventional vessels. 
Conversely, in order to maintain its stealth advantage, overall vessel speed is sacrificed, 
rendering a SPSS to operate at a much slower speed than most conventional vessels. 
Wakes caused by fast moving vessels, such as “go fasts,” are easily detected via aerial 
surveillance and would negate the stealth advantage of the standard SPSS vessel.  Since a 
SPSS is not capable of fully submersible operations it should be considered a surface 
craft just like any other boat or ship.  
It is the adjective semi-submersible that could also be partially responsible for the 
distortion of the actual threat posed by SPSS vessels. Essentially, all vessels are semi-
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submersible to some degree. When using this adjective, it would be natural to make 
conclusions about the vessels capabilities based upon previously viewed images from 
books, television shows, and motion pictures without effectively differentiating semi-
submersible from submersible. In Figure 16, a ride at an amusement park ride is 
fashioned in the image of the submarine Nautilus from the 1954 Walt Disney motion 
picture 20,000 Leagues under the Sea. Imagery like this can create vivid and exotic 
mental images in a person’s conscious and subconscious. Because the word semi-
submersible and submersible are so similar, they may be interpreted to have similar 
meanings by persons not familiar with these vessels.  
In Figure 17, an actual SPSS used by a DTO to smuggle illicit drugs is depicted, 
and there is a robust similarity between it and the vessel shown in Figure 16. The 
appearance and nomenclature of SPSSs lends itself to projecting an intimidating persona, 
but in reality they are no more dangerous or threatening than a conventional vessel of 
similar size and capacity. 
 
Figure 16.  Amusement Park Ride Based on the Movie 20,000 Leagues under the Sea (From 
Walt Disney’s 20,000 Leagues under the Sea: The Ride., n.d.) 
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Figure 17.  DTO Operated Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible Vessel (From U.S. Coast Guard 
and U.S. Navy Interdict Two Semi-Submersible Vessels, 2008) 
Another possible factor contributing to the social amplification of risk is the 
amount of media coverage given to the successful interdiction of SPSSs by maritime law 
enforcement agencies and navies. The open water apprehension of these vessels, their 
crews, and cargoes usually results in abundant media coverage. This intense media 
exposure can further reinforce misconceptions about these vessels, especially if these 
events occur frequently which can also cause an “immediacy bias” in the general public. 
The result of more interdictions is an increase in the frequency and duration of exposure 
of these images to the general public leading to increased misconceptions about the 
extent of the actual threat posed by these vessels. 
Although the theory of DTOs and international terrorists forming an alliance to 
transport a WMD to the shores of the U.S. sounds plausible, this threat has yet to 
materialize. The difference in ideologies and motivations of these two organizations does 
not currently support the realization of this threat scenario. Additionally, the actual threat 
posed by DTO SPSS vessels is commonly misunderstood by many HS practitioners, and 
the actual level of risk they pose to the MTS could be overestimated. This may be due to 
the social amplification of risk and the amount of media coverage that these vessels have 
received recently. DTO operated SPSS vessels do pose an established threat to national 
security for facilitating the transport of illegal drugs to the U.S. but currently there is no 
conclusive evidence indicating that that there is a significant risk of these smuggling 
vessels being used to fulfill the strategic objectives of an ITO. It would be prudent to 
continue to monitor the formulation and evolution of the relationships that DTOs and 
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ITOs form so that any changes in the strategic landscape that could alter their motivations 
in regards to the use of the SPSS as a terrorist weapon or transport vessel can be quickly 
detected, analyzed, and disseminated to HS policymakers. 
5. Consequences 
The DHS Risk Lexicon defines the term consequences as the effect of an event, 
incident, or occurrence (DHS, 2010, p.10). Consequences can be measured in four ways: 
human, economic, mission, and psychological. In addition, consequences may be either 
direct or indirect and also include other factors such as impact on the environment (DHS, 
2010, p. 10). In lieu of an actual event, consequence can only be estimated because of the 
intricate interdependence of many sub-systems that comprise a complex mega-system, 
such as the MTS. A terrorist attack carried out by a submersible would have severe and 
cascading economic impacts on the MTS. 
Historical events can provide some insight into the potential impact of a 
submersible attack on commercial shipping. On January30, 1945, while sailing in the 
Baltic Sea, the German passenger vessel Wilhelm Gustloff was sunk by a Russian 
submarine.  Many naval historians consider this one of the one of the worst marine 
disasters of all times. The Wilhelm Gustloff was carrying over 6,000 persons who were 
fleeing the war in East Prussia and were headed back to Western Germany (Kappes, 
2003). The amount of passengers onboard that night was estimated to be over three times 
the vessel’s normal operating capacity. The passengers were comprised of women, 
children, the elderly, about 1,200 wounded soldiers, and some Nazi officials (Kappes, 
2003). At 2035 hours that evening, the Russian submarine, S-13, fired three torpedoes at 
the unsuspecting vessel, and 5,348 people lost their lives (Kappes, 2003).  
 51 
 
Figure 18.  Artist’s Depiction of the Wilhelm Gustloff Sinking (From Krawczyk, n.d.) 
The high concentration of passengers that sail onboard modern cruise ships could 
make a submersible attack upon one of these vessels an attractive attack scenario for a 
group or individual intent on creating a maritime mass casualty event the scale of the 
Wilhelm Gustloff.  The Royal Caribbean Cruise Line operates the world’s largest capacity 
passenger vessel built to date. The Allure of the Seas cost $1.24 billion to construct and 
was launched in November 2010 (Associated Press, 2006). The ship’s maximum 
passenger capacity is 6,360, and the ship is manned by 2,384 crew members for a total 
onboard population of 8,744 (Royal Caribbean International, 2012).  
A successful attack against a vessel of this size and type would drastically impact 
the cruise industry and many other interrelated industries, such as the airline industry, 
would also be severely affected. The first order negative consequences of a successful 
submersible attack against a large cruise ship would be the potential loss of life of 
thousands of passengers and crew and the economic loss of the vessel itself—valued at 
over $1 billion USD.  If an attack resulted in a 50 percent casualty rate and the estimated 
insurance claim paid or judgment per casualty was $100,000 the resultant monetary loss 
would be as follows:  
4,372 passengers X $100,000 = $437,200,000 
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If the ship were a total loss the combined loss from this single incident would be 
nearly two billion dollars; this does not include losses derived from the cascading effects 
of the attack such as the long-term reduced global demand for cruise vacations.  Also, 
large vessels also carry enormous amounts of fuel and petroleum products, and a 
transportation security incident (TSI) resulting a breech a vessel’s watertight integrity 
could result in catastrophic damage to environmentally sensitive habitats.  After the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 that was based upon the International Ship and Port 
Facility (ISPS) Code adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
strengthen port and vessel security. A TSI resulting for a submersible attack against a 
high capacity passenger vessel would most likely result in expanded maritime regulation, 
thus resulting in reduced autonomy and increased costs for port and vessel operators.  
On January 13, 2012, the 114,500 ton cruise ship Costa Concordia ran aground 
near the Italian island of Giglio (BBC News Europe, 2012). The vessel had over 4,200 
passengers onboard and this maritime accident resulted in the deaths of 17 passengers 
with an additional 15 people still unaccounted for at this time. Salvage operations are 
expected to take at least 10 months to remove the vessel and its 2,300 tons of fuel (BBC 
News Europe, 2012). The net value of this vessel was $490 million USD at the time of 
the incident and the parent company, Carnival Corporation, has insurance coverage in the 
amount of $510 million USD for the vessel with a deductable of approximately $30 
million USD (Reuters UK Edition, 2012). The Carnival Corporation self-insures for the 
loss of the vessel and insurance for any third-party personal injury liability claims is 
subject to an additional deductible of about $10 million USD (Reuters UK Edition, 
2012). It is unknown at this time if the Costa Concordia can be salvaged or if it will be 
declared a total loss.  
The full economic impact of this tragic maritime disaster may take several years 
to be accurately accounted for, but luxury cruise bookings significantly declined in the 
days and weeks after the incident (Reuters U.S. Edition, 2012). After this incident 
occurred, the stock price for Carnival Corporation dropped to $27 on January 18, 2012 
from a price of $30 on January 12, 2012 (MSM Money, 2012). Other companies in the 
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luxury cruise industry were also severely impacted. For example, Royal Caribbean Cruise 
Line’s stock also dropped to $30 from $35 during the same period (MSM Money, 2012). 
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line has issued 500 million common stock shares so a loss of 
$5/share resulted in a total loss of $2.5 billion USD in value to the company’s common 
stock shareholders, and this company was not even involved in the incident (Royal 
Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 2009).12  
 






                                                 
12 This estimation of loss is derived from market conditions and reflects what the loss in value would 
be given the market parameters at a certain point in time. This estimation does not include preferred stock 
shares or an analysis of the potential impact on any future dividends the company may pay to shareholders 
but only on the market value of the 500 million common stock shares (Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 
2009). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The primary research question of this thesis was: How should the homeland 
security enterprise react to the emerging technology and availability of submersible 
vessels? 
There are several components to the answer to the above question. The HSE 
should accept that private small submersible vessels are an established and expanding 
attribute of the MTS. Technology and innovation have drastically reduced barriers to 
small submersible ownership and operation to a greater number of people than at any 
other time in history. As with any maturing technology, there will always be the potential 
that criminals or terrorists could use these vessels to further their strategic objectives and 
the HSE should be aware of this potential and continuously seek to obtain optimal 
situational awareness of this segment of the MTS. The HSE should seek to implement 
policy and strategy that mitigates the strategic risk posed by small submersibles while 
balancing the needs of all waterway users. In order to develop and implement effective 
policy and strategy, the HSE should seek to completely understand the small submersible 
threat that emanates from various potential users of small submersibles that range from 
international criminal and terrorist organizations to single HVEs. Finally, the HSE should 
explore how small submersible technology could be used in positive ways to enhance 
MHS at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
A. STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT   
1. Strategic Risk 
In order to develop appropriate strategies designed to mitigate the potential risk 
posed by small submersibles, HS policymakers must understand and apply the concept of 
strategic risk. Strategic risk is defined by the DHS Risk Lexicon as “risk that affects an 
entity’s vital interests or execution of chosen strategy, whether imposed by external 




Furthermore, the DHS Risk Lexicon also presents two annotations to the above definition 
that illustrate why understanding strategic risk is of the upmost value to an organization. 
Those annotations are: 
1. Managing strategic risk is associated with the ability to recognize future 
trends, challenges, and threats and match these with appropriate 
operational concepts, capabilities, competencies, and capacity.  
2. Strategic risk can arise from three basic sources.  First, strategic risk can 
arise from the actions of adversaries, from natural hazards or from non-
adversarial human actions, such as accidents.  These can be thought of as 
imposed risks.  Second, strategic risk can be created by the unintended 
consequences of the strategies we adopt in response to imposed risks.  
These can be thought of as self-imposed risks. Finally, strategic risk can 
arise from obstacles to successful implementation of an adopted strategy.  
These obstacles can be either imposed (e.g., the actions of an adaptive 
adversary to counter a security measure or to exploit an unintended 
vulnerability created by a security measure) or self-imposed (e.g., failure 
to adequately resource, or to prematurely abandon, a strategy or course of 
action that would otherwise be beneficial). (DHS, 2010, p. 35) 
As the perceived submersible threat began to gain attention in the media and in 
certain parts of DHS and the Department of Defense (DoD), it became apparent that there 
was a significant strategic gap in the SVSS strategy with regards to problem definition 
and assessing the risk posed by submersible vessels. The SVSS did not in any way 
address the emerging, complex, and adaptive threat posed by fully submersible vessels. 
As highlighted previously, the SVSS lists four specific tactical small vessels scenarios 
that are of primary concern to MHS practitioners (DHS, 2008). These scenarios are: 
• Domestic Use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs); 
• Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including WMDs) into the United 
States; 
• Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into the United States; 
• Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack (e.g., Man-Portable 
Air-Defense System (MANPADS) attacks). (DHS, 2008)  
All of these scenarios, except for the stand-off attack platform, are ideally suited 
for submersible vessels due to their primary tactical advantage of stealth. The SVSS and 
its supplemental implementation plan fell short in recognizing future trends, challenges, 
and threats with regards to the nefarious use of submersible vessels nor did it mitigate 
these with the appropriate operational concepts, capabilities, competencies, and capacity 
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necessary to reduce overall strategic risk (DHS, 2008). This strategic risk is derived from 
a combination of the imposed risks of the actions of adaptive adversaries and from the 
self-imposed organizational and system obstacles of the failure to successfully implement 
the adopted but inadequate strategy. 
2. DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) 
ITOs have used small boats to conduct attacks against military and civilian 
maritime targets with varying degrees of success. For the purposes of this paper, a small 
vessel is considered to be a watercraft that weighs less than 300 gross tons and consists 
of, but not limited to, jet skis, private recreational boats, commercial fishing boats, tow 
vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, and sail boats. In October 2000, the USS Cole 
was attacked by suicide bombers using a small boat in Yemen. Two years later, the 
French flagged oil tanker Limburg was severely damaged by a small boat suicide attack 
in the Gulf of Aden. In April 2004, several explosive-laden dhows were used to conduct a 
suicide attack against an offshore Iraqi oil platform in the North Arabian Gulf (Howe, 
2010). Additionally, small boats have been used to transport contraband and to facilitate 
human trafficking across maritime borders. Finally, the terrorist assault team that 
perpetrated the November 2008 Mumbai attacks entered India via a pirated small vessel 
(Roggio, 2008).  
The terror threat posed by small vessels is significant because a successful small 
boat attack within the territorial waters of the United States could result in significant loss 
of life, cascading economic impacts, and severe environmental damage. Additionally, the 
vast number of small vessels operating within the maritime transportation system with 
relatively few restrictions and the lack of relevant maritime domain awareness of small 
vessel operations contributes to the difficulty in defining and mitigating any potential 
threat. By the mid-2000s  the use of small boats by terrorists was recognized by DHS an 
emerging threat to the maritime transportation system but no comprehensive national 
strategy had been developed to counter this threat. 
In response to the increasing awareness of threats posed by small boats, DHS 
hosted a National Small Vessel Security Summit to address the security issues related to 
 58 
small boats in June 2007. This summit provided a forum for small vessel stakeholders to 
present their ideas for enhancing security and to voice their concerns to policymakers 
with regards to potential restrictions and/or regulations relating to small vessel 
operations. The results of this summit culminated in the formulation of the DHS SVSS 
that was released in April 2008 in an attempt to address the small boat threat. The SVSS 
contains four primary objectives: 
 Develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel 
community, public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime 
domain awareness. 
 Enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a 
layered, innovative approach. 
 Leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine the intent, 
and when necessary, interdict small vessels. 
 Enhance coordination, cooperation, and communication between federal, 
state, local and tribal partners and the private sector as well as 
international partners. (DHS, 2008)  
An analysis of the development and implementation of the SVSS is critical for HS 
policymakers who are intent on mitigating the risk posed by small submersibles. 
Although the SVSS does not specifically address submersible threats many of its key 
attributes are applicable to small submersible vessels. There are positive and negative 
lessons that can be learned from the SVSS that can be used to strengthen future HS policy 
in regards to conventional and submersible small vessel threats. The key concept to be 
reinforced here is that current HS strategy must be have the capacity and motivation to 
quickly adapt to a complex and dynamic threat environment.  
One of the primary strengths of the SVSS is that it identified and addressed 
stakeholder concerns prior to its development and implementation. The SVSS 
emphasized the development of key partnerships with all stakeholders in the small vessel 
community. The small vessel community is made up of recreational boaters and 
professional mariners who can be very resistant to additional government regulations. 




to unrestricted vessel operation. By engaging this community early, a sense of trust and 
cooperation could be developed; this is key to developing productive partnerships in a 
regulatory environment.  
This focus on developing public/private partnerships is in direct alignment with 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security released in October 2007. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security states: “Due to the multiple and essential roles the private 
sector plays across all areas of homeland security, continued collaboration and 
engagement with the private sector to strengthen preparedness is imperative” (DHS, 
2007). By fostering trust and collaboration with these stakeholders, DHS would be better 
positioned to achieve wider acceptance of the SVSS, especially the provisions that had 
the potential to negatively impact small vessel operators.  
Additionally, there are also some significant weaknesses in the SVSS that needed 
to be addressed by DHS and the small vessel community. According to report released by 
the DHS Inspector General in October 2009: 
DHS has not provided a comprehensive strategy for addressing small 
vessel threats. Neither its SVSS nor its draft Implementation Plan 
effectively addresses all the desirable characteristics and elements of a 
national strategy. In addition, the department has not evaluated the 
effectiveness of critical programs that are expected to serve as a 
foundation for small vessel security and may not be providing anticipated 
results.  
The Government Accountability Office has determined that an effective national 
strategy should consist of six desirable characteristics (Inspector General, 2009). The two 
desirable characteristics adequately addressed by the SVSS were: 
• Purpose, scope, and methodology  
• Problem definition and risk assessment. (Inspector General, 2009) 
The four desirable characteristics of a national strategy not adequately addressed 
by the SVSS were: 
• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures  
• Resources, investments, and risk management  
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• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination  
• Integration and implementation. (Inspector General, 2009) 
In regards to the effectiveness of the SVSS, the 2009 DHS Inspector General 
report further stated, “It partially addresses elements such as strategic priorities and 
milestones, and roles and responsibilities of state and local sectors, but it does not address 
performance measures, associated costs or human capital, or accountability and oversight 
frameworks” (Inspector General, 2009). Additional criticism of the SVSS has asserted 
that the strategy only incorporates existing programs, processes, and assets while failing 
to determine what level of resources are needed to address current vulnerabilities 
(Inspector General, 2009). Furthermore, the failure of the SVSS to address all the 
desirable characteristics of a national strategy and its inability to look beyond existing 
programs, processes, and assets severely limits the effectiveness as a national strategy. It 
should be noted that DHS did make effort to mitigate some the strategic shortfalls 
identified by the GAO in the SVSS by introducing the Small Vessel Security 
Implementation Plan in January 2011 (DHS, 2011). 
3. Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) of 2008 
To date, SPSS vessels have been used to smuggle cocaine from South 
America to the United Sates but they could be converted to smuggle 
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction. Through current legislation 
pending in the Congress, we are trying to criminalize the operation of 
stateless SPSS vessels on international voyages. This will allow us to 
prosecute SPSS operators, deter the use of these vessels for other illicit 
purposes and increase the safety of Coast Guard boarding teams.  
Admiral Thad Allen, 23rd Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (Allen, T. 2008) 
On October 13, 2008, the President of the United States of America signed into 
law the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) of 2008. This legislation was in 
response to the increasing numbers of SPSS vessels being scuttled just before they could 
be interdicted by law enforcement or military officials and the difficulty in prosecuting 
the crews for narcotics trafficking when all of the evidence was lost at sea with the 
vessel. The DTVIA essentially makes operating a SPPS/SPFS vessel in international 
waters a crime prosecutable in U.S. federal law. The SPSS or SPFS must be a 
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nonregistered vessel exhibiting the intent to evade detection. This law makes operating 
unregistered submersible vessels in international waters illegal so recovery of any illicit 
drugs is not a factor in bringing charges against the crewmembers under this particular 
law (Kash & White, 2010).  
The DTVIA was intended to deter the use of submersible vessels to transport 
illegal drugs, but this strategy may be causing unintended consequences that could make 
future interdiction operations even more difficult for law enforcement. Since DTOs are 
complex adaptive adversaries who are committed to continuing their illegal drug 
business, they have no choice but to adapt their distribution network and TTPs to 
compensate for this new legislative barrier. The next logical adaption for the DTOs 
would be to transition their fleet of SPSS vessels to one made up exclusively of SPFS 
vessels. The strategic shift to fully-submersible operations would place law enforcement 
agencies and the military at a distinct disadvantage in the arena of detection and 
interdiction capability. The DTVIA could have the unintended result of making the 
distribution networks of DTOs even more effective and efficient until authorities could 
adequately counter fully-submersible centered distribution systems; however, there could 
be a significant time lag before new technologies could be developed and deployed. 
Additionally, this law may expedite the development and implementation of fully remote-
controlled submersible vessels that would negate the law’s effectiveness as a deterrent to 
drug smuggling. It would also eliminate the need for human crewmembers and their 
associated weaknesses, such as the negative emotions of fear and greed.   
It is worth noting that DTVIA was intended to address the problem of maritime 
transportation of narcotics via submersibles and not the international transportation of a 
WMD/WME or of a potential terrorist to U.S shores. DVTIA is broad enough that it 
could be used to prosecute someone operating a stateless submersible that is transporting 
a WMD/WME in international waters, but it would not apply to a personally owned and 
operated domestic submersible used for a terrorist attack in U.S. waters.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO MITIGATE THE RISK 
If the submersible threat can be reduced then overall risk reduction to the 
maritime domain can be achieved. The following are recommendations for enhancing the 
effectiveness of the SVSS with regards to mitigating the threat posed by submersible 
vessels. These recommendations directly support the accomplishment of the four primary 
objectives of the SVSS while reducing strategic risk. These recommendations are not 
intended to replace or modify the general recommendations issued by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in regards to the SVSS, rather they are intended to 
specifically address the submersible threat while enhancing the overall effectiveness of 
the SVSS. 
1. Develop and Leverage Strong Partnerships 
The most significant information gaps in regards to achieving a baseline level of 
maritime domain awareness (MDA) when attempting to quantify the submersible threat 
is knowledge of how many of these vessels are in operation, where are they operated, and 
who is operating them. Without answering these questions, it is impossible to accurately 
estimate the scale of the potential threat. Engagement with legitimate owners/operators of 
domestic submersible vessels would be the first step in reducing this intelligence gap 
since these stakeholders would have the most accurate information available and would 
know when there are anomalies in the system worth reporting. Additionally, security 
awareness programs such as DHS’s “If you see something, say something”™13 campaign 
and the U.S. Coast Guard’s “America’s Waterway Watch”14 program, can also be 
leveraged to supply data on domestic submersible operations. Another potential course of 
action would be to implement federal regulation of all submersible vessels operating in 
U.S. territorial waters, which would provide detailed information on submersible vessel 
                                                 
13 The “If you see something, say something”™ is DHS’s public awareness program that encourages 
citizens to report suspicious persons and/or activity to law enforcement. The program was originally 
implemented by New York City’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority and has since been adapted for 
national dissemination by DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d. a). 
14 “America’s Waterway Watch” is the U.S. Coast Guard’s public awareness program that encourages 
the boating public to report suspicious persons and/or activity with a maritime nexus to the National 
Response Center and/or law enforcement (America’s Waterway Watch, 2011). 
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operation in domestic waters. Regulation could take many forms such as requiring these 
vessels to be registered with the federal government, mandating the utilization of 
automatic identification system (AIS) technology and vetting submersible 
owners/operators. Even if submersible vessels were federally regulated, there could still 
be significant gaps in information since clandestine existence of personal submarines 
would be nearly impossible to detect. 
2. Enhance Maritime Security and Safety  
The natural adaptation and evolution of the SVSS would be for the strategy to 
address all small vessel threats (surface and sub-surface) at the local level. In order to 
effectively reduce strategic risk, the enhancement of local area maritime security plans 
(AMSPs) to address the small vessel threat would be necessary. These AMSPs are 
produced and maintained for each U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COPT) zone 
and are validated by all maritime stakeholders via the local area maritime security 
committees (AMSCs). The addition of a small vessel security annex to these AMSPs 
would facilitate mitigation of the small vessel threat (surface and sub-surface) by 
translating the national strategy into localized operational and tactical plans with key 
areas of emphasis, including the establishment of quantifiable performance measures 
along with resource identification and allocation.  
One of the fundamental components used in formulating the AMSP is the 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM). MSRAM is an analysis tool used by 
the U.S. Coast Guard to evaluate risk to critical maritime infrastructure and key 
resources. Furthermore, this tool evaluates maritime security risk using threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences calculated for a standardized set of attack scenarios to 
provide a common risk framework. If a small vessel security annex to the AMSP is 
developed and implemented, then MSRAM will need to be enhanced to account for 
differences in the achievability and resulting impacts for surface versus sub-surface 
WBIED attack scenarios. Currently, MSRAM does not have the capability to evaluate 
risk in regards to potential submersible attack scenarios. 
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3. Leverage Technology  
In order to mitigate the submersible threat in potentially vulnerable ports the use 
of detection technologies, such as side-scan SONAR arrays, would be a key component 
of any local plan. Without detection, there can be no interdiction; therefore, this should 
be a priority resourcing requirement as determined by the AMSC membership and 
MSRAM data analysis. The optimal strategy to mitigate the small submersible threat 
would place great emphasis on the concept of deterrence. If a potential adversary is 
denied access to a target, then the threat will either dissipate or shift to another softer 
target.  
High value targets that are vulnerable to the submersible threat can be protected 
from submersible attacks with boat barriers that extend their protective reach from the 
water’s surface to the bottom. These anti-submarine nets or barriers could also be used to 
deny access to vulnerable areas such as the mouth of a harbor or strait. Furthermore, 
deterrence and detection strategies could be formulated to complement each other and 
maximize the utilization of available resources. In order to address some of the 
challenges with resource allocation, the feasibility of linking the SVSS and any locally 
developed AMSP plan annex to the Port Security Grant Program and its national 
priorities should be explored and encouraged. This could provide a funding source for 
consolidated efforts to implement this strategy and the local plans needed to address the 
small submersible threat. 
An additional opportunity to utilize technology in order to increase MDA with 
respect to submersible vessels would be the mandated use of AIS technology for any 
privately owned submersible vessel. AIS can relay a surface vessel’s course and speed in 
real time to other ships and shore-based monitoring stations. By mandating AIS use on 
every submersible, regardless of size or intended use, local, state, and federal maritime 
enforcement agencies would have a more complete common operational picture (COP) of 
submersible activity within the local port area. Before this course of action is pursued, 
however, further research would be needed to determine how effective AIS transmissions 
from submerged vessels operating at depth would be and if AIS technology could be 
enhanced to transmit accurate depth information.  
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The technical aspects and associated costs could render this option to be 
impractical for the foreseeable future. Additionally, an accurate cost-benefit analysis 
cannot be conducted until a complete census of these types of vessels is completed. AIS 
effectiveness would also depend upon the extent of compliance by submersible 
owner/operators as some individuals could purposely elect not to comply with an AIS 
mandate. It is possible that new forms of technology that could exceed the current 
capabilities of AIS could be developed to solve this problem and give HS policymakers 
an accurate multi-dimensional COP of private submersible operations. 
4. Enhance Coordination, Cooperation, and Communication  
Since the AMSCs would be key to developing local small vessel threat response 
plans, there should be continued emphasis on engaging all maritime stakeholders in the 
planning process. Once these local plans are developed, the next step would be to 
exercise these them in order to determine gaps in MDA, intelligence gathering and 
sharing, training, policies and procedures, as well as resource shortfalls. The continuous 
improvement process of planning, exercising, and then taking corrective actions would 
allow AMSCs to reduce strategic risk in their local areas. The collective result of multiple 
AMSCs accomplishing this risk reduction through effective strategy implementation 
would facilitate an overall risk reduction across the entire maritime transportation system.  
The final area of opportunity where the AMSCs could have significant impact on 
the mitigation of the small submersible threat would be in the development of appropriate 
and effective interdiction TTPs. Although this is an operational and tactical issue, it has 
significant implications for reducing overall strategic risk in the maritime domain. The 
use of force parameters for domestic law enforcement agencies are fairly congruent and 
standardized as well as the tools used to mitigate threats and gain compliance. One of the 
key components in selecting what level of force to use to counter a threat is determining 
if hostile intent is present. How to determine the intent of a fully submersible small vessel 
operating in a congested harbor is a truly wicked problem for frontline law enforcement 
officers. The solution to this problem must be worked out with all stakeholders to 
included legitimate operators of submersible vessels. Accurately determining a 
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submersible vessel’s intent may not be realistically achievable in time to mitigate a 
potential threat. If early detection is accomplished along with the establishment of hostile 
intent then the options to employ appropriate countermeasures by local law enforcement 
are extremely limited.  
The experts in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are the U.S. military and the 
current suite of ASW countermeasures includes rockets, mortars, torpedoes, missiles, and 
depth charges.  These countermeasures are all considered deadly force options and 
present legal and ethical challenges for domestic law enforcement agencies to consider. 
This situation does present a research opportunity for less than lethal non-destructive 
ASW countermeasures and technology that can be employed by law enforcement 
agencies. The development of interdiction TTPs and effective countermeasures are the 
final steps in reducing the strategic risk posed by small submersible vessels, but these 
will be the most difficult to achieve due to legal and ethical issues, resources constraints, 
incomplete MDA, and technology gaps. 
5. Regulating Disruptive Technology 
The potential risks posed by disruptive submersible technology could be partially 
mitigated through the use of new or existing regulation, but not all stakeholders will be 
open to this course of action. Regulation could encompass several measures such as 
requiring submersibles to be registered as such and reported to the U.S. Coast Guard or 
licensing requirements could be implemented. Other measures could include requiring 
submersible vessels to carry tracking technology, such as AIS, and the contingency of the 
ownership and operation of submersibles upon a vetting process similar to what the 
TWIC card program requires.  
The personal sub community would most certainly be opposed at any attempt by 
the U.S. government to further regulate submersible vessels. Members of the boating 
public are generally opposed to any additional government regulation as they perceive 
this an attempt to limit their fundamental rights and freedoms with regards to the use of 
and unrestricted access to the water. The personal submarine community is very small 
and would be at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to oppose any new regulatory 
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efforts. Their only course of action would be to align themselves with the numerous but 
larger boating associations, clubs, and other maritime groups across the nation. 
Furthermore, these nautical alliances could give the personal submarine community the 
necessary lobbying base to effectively oppose any new proposed legislation that could 
limit their unrestricted access to the waterways of the U.S. These potential alliances could 
impede any efforts to enact new legislation or modify existing federal or state laws and 
should be anticipated by policymakers.  
The MTS is a complex system of networks that coexist as well as compete. The 
personal submarine community is a sub-system of the recreational boating system and to 
a lesser degree the commercial tourist boating system. All of the system components 
comprise a nested mega-system that exists within a framework of regulatory influences. 
The impact of regulation upon one system has potential impacts, both positive and 
negative, upon the other sub-systems. One option to facilitate enhancing security while 
balancing stakeholder concerns would be to initiate open dialogue between the federal 
and state governments with the personal submarine community and other maritime 
stakeholders. This approach was used in the early development of the SVSS when DHS 
conducted a National Small Vessel Security Summit to learn of stakeholder concerns 
prior to strategy formulation. This same approach could be used to engage the members 
of the personal submarine community and solicit their concerns about new and/or 
increased regulation and what their recommendations for enhancing maritime security 
might be. The effective use of this type of stakeholder engagement would allow for the 
development a circular feedback loop between regulators and the personal submarine 
community, which would result in a more effective methodology to address this risk. 
Relevant and actionable feedback loops could facilitate optimal strategy formulation and 
eventual acceptance from all the system stakeholders. 
Several factors could have the potential to hinder the implementation of these 
recommendations. One key factor that is critical to successful implementation is 
resourcing. If regulatory agencies are not adequately resourced to implement and enforce 
any new regulations, then the initiative is doomed to be a failure. Another variable that 
must be anticipated is the potential for technological advances in tracking technology. As 
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tracking technology becomes cheaper and more effective then overall MDA can be 
enhanced, which could reduce the need for further regulation. Timelines for the 
implementation of these recommendations is another important variable to consider. The 
DHS SVSS was released in 2008, but the accompanying implementation plan was not 
released until early 2011.  Without timely implementation, the strategic landscape that 
these recommendations are based upon will most likely evolve and change, which could 
render them irrelevant and outdate. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several opportunities for future research in regards to the threat posed 
by small submersible vessels. One area that would be extremely beneficial for developing 
and maintaining MDA would be an examination of current and future tracking 
technology, such as automatic identification systems (AIS), and how such technology can 
be used to track private submarines operating under the water’s surface in proximity to 
maritime critical infrastructure/key resources (MCI/KR). This data could be used to 
develop parameters to assist in the determination that submersible vessel poses an 
imminent threat based upon data analysis, such as operational pattern analysis.  
Another avenue for future research would be an examination of current and 
potential technologies to stop a submersible vessel that was exhibiting hostile intent. The 
use of non-lethal technology to disable and/or deter a submersible attack would give 
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies enhanced capabilities to potentially 
mitigate this threat and protect high risk maritime assets.  
Finally, another are for future research would be how the HSE could possibly 
utilize small submersibles to enhance HS through such activities as using remotely 
operated subs to conduct coastal surveillance of locations susceptible to maritime 
smuggling or to covertly patrol MCI/KR. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Three conclusions can be made based upon the findings of this study on the 
potentially disruptive nature of small submersible vessel technology. The first conclusion 
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is that the perfidious use of submersible technology by terrorists or terrorist organizations 
is a significant concern for MHS policymakers. Incremental innovations in submersible 
technology have the potential to be recombined in disruptive ways that constitute a meta-
threat to the MHS enterprise. Historical analysis demonstrates that small submersibles 
have been effectively used by nation states, criminal organizations, and terrorists in order 
to attain asymmetric advantages over their adversaries within the maritime domain. The 
recognition of the small submersible’s underestimated capability to inflict disproportional 
adverse consequences to the MTS is necessary in order to develop a sound understanding 
of this emerging threat, which is fundamental to developing policy to reduce risk.  
The second major conclusion is that the actual risk posed by small submersibles 
to the MHS enterprise is misunderstood by most HS policymakers. The current use of 
small submersibles by international criminal organization to conduct smuggling activities 
is perceived as a potential threat to HS, but these profit driven organizations do not 
possess the intent necessary to constitute a viable terrorist threat. Although drug 
trafficking presents a significant threat to national security the probability that these 
entities will align themselves with transnational terrorist organizations to conduct joint 
offensive operations against the U.S. is quite remote.  The true asymmetrical threat 
potential of small submersible vessels already exists within U.S. territorial waters.  A 
homegrown violent extremist or determined terrorist with modest resources has almost 
unrestricted and anonymous access to submersible technology and thus could assuredly 
perpetrate an unconventional black swan attack scenario using a small submersible vessel 
on domestic maritime critical infrastructure or key resources (MCI/KR).  
The final major conclusion of this study is that since the MHS enterprise does not 
adequately understand the threat posed by small submersibles, then system vulnerability 
exists in the maritime domain at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Current 
MHS strategy and policy does not specifically address the meta-threat posed by small 
privately operated domestic submersible vessels. The lack of baseline levels of maritime 
domain awareness on domestic small submersibles with regards to their population, 
location, ownership, and operational characteristics prevents any meaningful risk analysis 
to base appropriate HS policy formulation on.  
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Additionally, from an operational and tactical perspective, the MHS enterprise 
does not have the capability and/or expertise to effectively or efficiently counter 
submersible threats as there are no appropriate and available countermeasures nor any 
universally applicable use of force policies in place to adequately and timely address 
potential submersible threats. The current SVSS could serve as the framework to develop 
an effective, appropriate, and relevant strategy to counter the small submersible threat to 
maritime homeland security. The attainment of a basic understanding of the dynamics of 
this threat, such as developing baseline MDA objectives, and establishing a better 
understanding of the small submersible vessel sub-system will be a key first step in 
facilitating the mitigation of the strategic, operational, and tactical system vulnerability of 
this potentially disruptive technology.  
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